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ABSTRACT
Myth and hysteria are probably the two most common
attributes of western discourse on Islamic fundamentalism.
Current discussions in policy circles often depict this
'green menace' as a threat to the stability of -regimes
friendly to the United States. A recent incarnation of this
argui-Lnt is the suggestion, following apparent unprecedented
electoral gains by Islamic fundamentalists in 1991, that
Turkey may be the next Iran or Algeria.
This thesis debunks the 'fundamentalist threat'
argument in Turkey by critically examining the evidence used
to support such an argument. A careful examination of the
election-results in 1991 shows the Islamic fundamentalists
actually suffered a decline in electoral support.
The thesis concludes that the secular democratic nature
of the Turkish republic is not seriously threatened by
Islamic fundamentalism, and that the evidence used to
suggest such a development does not stand up to critical
scrutiny. Accesion For
NTIS CRA&I
D.- .q D C TAB
C .......... ....................
By ..............
U J J ,jtioI I
iA'.1 i I or
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the
author and do not reflect the official policy or position of
the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
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EXECUTIVE SUMICARY
Dr. Philip Robins, Head of the Middle East Programme at
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, has suggested
that since the Iranian revolution, Western strategists have
been preoccupied by the "Islamic Threat" to friendly Muslim
states. Increasingly since the 1980's, Turkey is viewed as
being threatened by "Islamic fundamentalism," and as another
nation expected to "go Muslim."
Evidence used to support the position that Islamic
fundamentalism is on the rise in Turkey includes a diverse
array of political and social elements. Strongest among this
evidence are interpretations of the 1991 national election
results. In these important elections, the "Islamic
fundamentalist" Prosperity Party received 16.88% of the vote
and an additional 52 parliament seats.
The increase of Islamic banking, appointments of large
numbers of Islamic leaning politicians to the bureaucracy,
an increase in the wear of the headscarf, which is seen by
many as syirbolic of Islam, and a growing "Hezbollah"
terrorist movement in Southeast Turkey are also viewed as
proof of growing Islamic fundamentalism.
viii
This thesis debunks the "fundamentalist threat" argument
in Turkey by critically examining this evidence. For
instance, a careful examination of the election results of
1991 shows the Islamic fundamentalists actually suffered a
decline in electoral support; this decline had been obscured
by the nature of the coalition which made up the
fundamentalist party. Moreover, an examination of the
personalities and platform of the Prosperity Party suggests
only token interest in issues of Islamicization, and much
greater involvement in issues of industrialization and
economic development. In addition, demographic realities in
Turkey, such as the Alevis and the strong left-of-center
voting block, pose a structural impediment to significantly
enhancing electoral support for the fundamentalists.
Finally, the increased attention to certain social
practices, such as the wearing of the headscarf, and other
"evidence", such as increased Islamic banking, have
alternative explanations which do not support the Islamic
fundamentalist argument.
The thesis concludes that the secular democratic nature
of the Turkish republic is not seriously threatened by
Islamic fundamentalism.
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I. THE ACCURACY OF "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM" IN TURKEY
Author Nazih Ayubi has suggested many Western scholars
have erroneously concluded that most Muslims have rejected
t)? notion of the modern state in favor of some Islamic
political entity.' In turn, often through academically
untenable positions expounding the inflexibility and
antagonistic nature of Islam to the state, these same
scholars have influenced western society's perceptions of
the Islamic World. According to Ayubi, some of these
positions have included such fallacies as the belief that
the concept of the nation-state has no tradition in the
Islamic World. Another is that a heavy "intellectual
legacy", such as the classical Muslim view of dividing the
world between the dar al-islam (realm of peace) and dar al-
harb (realm of war), inhibits more modern political
concepts. The results of scholarly misperceptions and
warnings about Islam and politics in the Islamic World are
now popularly referred to as "Islamic fundamentalism", or
a similar term.
'Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the
Arab World (London; Routledge, 1991), 42.
2Ibid., 44-46.
Western notions of "fundamentalism" in Islam are heavily
influenced by 20th century movements in American
Protestantism, which espouses a literalist interpretation of
the Bible.' This term, when applied to Islam implies that a
difference exists between Muslims who do not hold a
literalist view of the Ouran, and those who do. In fact,
there is no such dichotomy in Islamic culture as the Ouran
is considered by all Muslims to be the literal word of
(1;d.' Furthermore, as Professor John Esposito points out,
-1.is term is associated with pejorative concepts like
extremism, fanaticism and anti-Americanism, among others.!
The inaccurate application of this term is symbolic then of
Western misperceptions about this important phenomenon.
As mistakes are being made in Western circles at such a
basic level in regard to understanding "Islamic activism,"'
one must question the accuracy of the accepted wisdom
expounded on other issues related to this topic. For
3For an excellent discussion on the use of this term read John
L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat; Myth or Reality?, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 7-8.
4Ibid., 7-8, and Professor Glenn Robinson, NS 4300, Naval
Postgraduate School, 24 Feb 93.
5Ibid., 7-8.
6This alternative term is suggested by Professor Robinson. I
will use this term and others, to include the now popularized
"fundamentalism," to connote the notion of a politically active and
sometimes violent Islamic movement.
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instance, is there truly a radical Islamic revival spreading
throughout the entire Middle East, Central Asia, and
elsewhere, as implied in the popular media? In an April 1992
article in The Economist, the message was clear that an
"anti-Western" Islamic revival was occurring in numerous
countries. This article displayed a map of North Africa,
the Middle East and Central Asia, with references to 17
countries haviJng some level of disturbing Islamic activity.
Even the Republic of Turkey, which has been officially
secular since Ataturk amended the constitution in 1928 to
remove the reference to Turkey as an Islamic state,ý and
with arguably the most entrenched Western values of any
Muslim country, is implied to be threatened. This is not a
novel claim. The Washington Post also ran a story in April
1992, using this same map of the world with its 17
highlighted Muslim countries under the shadow of Islamic
fundamentalism. The caption for Turkey read as follows:
The Welfare Party, seeking closer ties with the
Islamic world, ran in the October 1991 election in
alliance with two nationalist parties, the alliance
7
,"Islam Resumes its March," The Economist (4-10 Apr 92); 47-
48.
'Sydney Nettleton Fischer and William Ochsenwald, The Middle
East. A History, 4th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing
Company, 1990), 406.
3
won 17 percent of the vote but no seats (sic]. Several
small fundamentalist groups engage in terrorism.'
Claims about the threat of a resurgent Islam to Turkey
have not come from the press alone. In 1984, one Western
think-tank noted that secularism in Turkey, "has been
eroding. ""i More recently, another Western pundit described
Turkey as "quasi-secular."" Is this to imply it is more
Islamic than secular, or that it is slipping towards some
concept of an Islamic state? David Barchard, writing for
The World Today, wrote this pessimistic note in 1990 about
Islam in Turkey:
However, other intellectuals are now beginning to argue
that the intelligentsia must try and create a
dialogue with Turkey's resurgent Islamic movements,
even if-as seems fairly clear-one of the goals of those
movements is to eliminate secular and westernizing
values from Turkish political life.'2
Are these and other assertions about the extent of
Islamic activism in Turkey accurate? Should there be
9This caption is incorrect, as the Welfare Party alliance won
62 seats. This was later corrected. The source for this map was
listed as The Economist. Dave Coor, "Islam: Politics and Piety,"
The Washinaton Post, 26 Apr 1992, A28.
'
0Daniel Pipes, "Fundamentalist Muslims and U.S. Policy," The
Heritage Foundation International Briefing, (Washington, D.C.: The
Heritage Foundation), 10 Aug 1984.
"Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's Catapult to
Independence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (Summer 1992): 125.
S2David Barchard, "Turkey's Troubled Prospect," WorJ-
Today, Vol. 46, No. 6, (Jun 1990): 109.
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concern that Turkey, a strong U.S. ally and model of
modernity in the Middle East and greater Muslim World,
could, at one extreme, eventually resemble its theocratic
neighbor Iran? Or, as Ayubi and others might argue, is
this simply another unfounded fear based on fallacies,
ignorance, and an uncritical acceptance of information
expounding a negative image of Islam? To anyone who follows
events in Turkey, there have been obvious signs of Islamic
resurgence in the last few years. But, do these Islamic
sentiments necessarily reflect "Islamic fundamentalism," as
this term is understood in the West?
Clearly, there are expressions of Islamic activism in
Turkey. It would be surprising if there were not some degree
of Islamic expression in a country with a population of 58
million people, 99 percent of whom are Muslim. 3 However,
the evidence being used to demonstrate the extent of Islamic
activism in Turkey today, like many aspects of the Middle
East and Islam, is being taken out of context. It is my
thesis that the evidence for warnings of a serious Islamic
challenge to Ataturk's secular legacy are weak. I will
argue this point in the first section of this paper by
examining and placing in perspective recent political and
13PC Globe, Version 4.0 (New York, N.Y.: Copyright 1990, PC
Globe, Inc.) Citing World Population Data Sheet, Washington:
Population Bureau, 1990.
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social factors construed to be signs of Islamic activism in
Turkey. Before proceeding with an examination of the
political and social evidence, it is first necessary to
define the distinct elements which fall under the rubric of
Islamic fundamentalism.
A. NECESSARY DISTINCTIONS AMONG ISLAMIC GROUPS
In the legitimate concern over the rise of Islamic
movements which conduct or threaten hostile acts against the
interests of the U.S. and its Western and Middle Eastern
allies, the return by many Muslims to the fold of Islam has
been erroneously equated to an increase in Islamic
fundamentalism. The two are not synonymous. The problem
stems from a combination of mistakes. One is the
excessive and wrongful application of the term
fundamentalism to numerous entities undeserving of this
negative title. Another is the failure to make appropriate
distinctions between the sundry of Islamic groups. Such
distinctions should involve the separation between truly
threatening movements based on distorted, fringe
interpretations of Islam, and those Muslims adhering or
returning to the traditional values embodied in their
religion for personal reasons.
To a certain degree this distinction can be made by
recognizing that there are social and political components
6
grouped under the umbrella of fundamentalism. In general,
social movements involving Islam may simply reflect an
individual's desire to return to his religion. Such is
presently the case in Central Asia, where Islam was
repressed both under the Russians and Soviets. As Oliver Roy
of the French National Center for Scientific Research in
Paris said:
Since 1988, Islam has become visible. Mosques have
re-opened, mullahs are active, and religious schools
are under construction. This does not mean that a wave
of fundamentalism has engulfed Central Asia; Islam had
always remained active in the underground and has now
made a comeback.1
4
Similar social groups desiring a return to Islam can not
be discounted in Turkey. As in Central Asia, the return of
Islam to Turkey may reflect an attempt by some Turks to
recapture their religious heritage which, if not in
opposition to Ataturk's principles, was certainly eclipsed
by them in public.
In regard to Islamic political movements, further
recognition must be made between those seeking to reform the
state, while maintaining its essential entity, from those
who challenge the state system. Some actors may be
"
14Oliver Roy, "Central Asian Republics: New Elements in
Regional Politics," in Balance of Power in Central and Southwest
Asia, ed. Steven R. Dorr and Lt. Neysa M. Slater, USN (Defense
Intelligence Agency: Defense Academic PRsearch Support Program,
1992), 98.
7
completely amenable to accepting participation in the
existing political process. Others may challenge the very
legitimacy of the state system and campaign for its
abolishment in its present form, to be replaced by their
understanding of a proper Islamic state as embodied in
sources such as the Ouran, hadiths and sharia.
Among the groups which fall under the rubric of Islam,
it is possible to make five distinctions. These
distinctions become useful in avoiding the mistake of
labeling all politically and socially active Islamic
entities as Islamic fundamentalists. First, there is state
Islam, such as the present system of government in Saudi
Arabia. The puritanical Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia is strict
and does condone behavior antithetical to generally accepted
Western values, such as polygyny. State Islam, however, is
not necessarily a threat, nor an irreconciliable barrier to
friendly relations with the West.
Next, there is the high ulama, or those among the
religious learned who have studied Islam in the structured
theological institutions of the Islamic World, such as Al-
Azhar University. Not withstanding the occasional
exceptions, this class of pious Muslims, particularly of the
Sunni sect, has been guided traditionally to support the
S. . . ... ' " i l i i l ~ l l8
state and to avoid politics, as taught by the great scholar
of his time, Al Ghazzali, (1058-1111).'5
A third distinction under the greater rubric of Islam
involves Islamic societies. Many of these societies appear
most interested in improving local living conditions. Their
actions often involve the building of clinics and schools. A
prime example is the mainstream element of the Muslim
Brotherhood of Egypt.
Fourth, there are popular Islamic movements, such as the
National Salvation Front in Algeria. Turkey's fundamentalist
political parties would also fall into this category. Many
of these popular movements desire to reform the state, often
by working within the political boundaries. However, it is
often unclear from their political platforms, if they would
be willing to eventually relinquish power when necessary, as
dictated in a democratic system, and respect the rights of
non-Muslims once in control.
Finally, there is the fifth group of fundamentalists,
which should be of concern to the West. These are the
militants feared in Western minds for their notorious,
apparently wanton acts of violence. Among the more notable
actions associated with these militants are the
"
5Professor Ralph Magnus, NS 3320, Naval Postgraduate School,
9 Mar 93.
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assassination of Anwar Sadat, the bombing of the U.S. Marine
barracks in Lebanon, and, most recently, the murders outside
of the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
the bombing of the World Trade Center building in New York.
The various entities which conduct or support these acts
justify their violence through unorthodox, often twisted
interpretations of Islam. These are unquestionably the true
Islamic fundamentalists which threaten U.S. interests.
Unfortunately, the often questionable long-term
intentions of the populist element and the militant sect are
also the most noticeable aspects of the wider, generally
peaceful revival occurring within Islam. These two aspects
are mistakenly symbolic in the West of much of what this
religion and its resurgence represent. As the evidence
alleged to purport a strong fundamentalist movement in
Turkey, or elsewhere in the Muslim World is presented, these
important distinctions should be applied to separate the
true fundamentalist elements of concern, from those groups
associated with Islam which are neither a political threat
to the indigenous government, nor threatening from a Western
perspective.
B. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AN ISLAMIC THREAT IN TURKEY
Among the strongest evidence being touted today that
Islamic sentiments are on the rise in Turkey are the
10
successes of Islamic parties in local and national
elections. Recently, these successes cai± be divided
into two periods. The first period involved the achievements
of the former ruling Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi or
ANAP) of Turgut Ozal, and his successor Yildirim Akbulut.'
During their reigns. as Prime Minister, in which ANAP had a
commanding control of the Grand National Assembly," they
implemented certain Islamic practices and appointed numerous
politicians with Islamic leanings to key positions
throughout the various ministries of the Turkish
bureaucracy. This period of Islamic advancement began with
ANAP's ascendancy in 1983, and Ozal's selection as Prime
Minister.Is It ended with ANAP's failure to maintain
control of the Grand National Assembly and the Prime
Minister's post in the 20 October 1991 elections.' 9
16Akbulut replaced Ozal as Prime Minister when Ozal was elected
President in November 1989, through his party's control of
parliament. Barchard, 208.
"
7The Grand National Assembly is the legislative body of
Turkey. It consists of 450 deputies who are elected every five
years. Paul M. Pitman III, ed., Turkey: A Country Study 4th ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Priting Office, 1988), 248.
18Feroz Ahmad,. "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey," Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, (Jan 1991), 18.
'
9The locus of power in the Turkish Government is the Prime
Minister's post. This position belongs to the head of the ruling
party of the Grand Natiunal Assembly. The post is presently held by
Suleyman Demirel of the ruling True Path Party. The post of
President, which is subservient in power to the Prime Minister, was
11
It is interesting to note that during Ozal's tenure as
Prime Minister, he was considered by the U.S. as a staunch
ally and beacon of stability in a region troubled by Islamic
activism and aggressive dictators. One need only reflect on
the numerous personal phone calls, visits, and photo
opportunities between him and former Presidents Reagan and
Bush, and even a visit to Turkey by Bush, to understand
that, up to his death, Ozal was a close ally of the U.S.
And yet, this close alliance between the U.S. and Ozal seems
to stand in stark contrast to his background and the makeup
of the ANAP party.
To discuss ANAP and its connection with Islamic
activism, the origins of this party must be briefly
reviewed. On 12 September 1980, the Turkish General Staff
stepped in to take control of a quickly disintegrating
Turkey. For almost the entire previous ten years political
violence had run rampant in Turkey between left and right
wing students and terrorist organizations. Between 1976 and
1980, political violence resulted in the deaths of an
estimated 4,500 Turks. 2" After a severe clamping down by the
military on political activities, which included the arrest
held by Turgut Ozal until his death in April 1993.
2 0Sabri Sayari and Bruce Hoffman, Urbanization and InsurQency:
The Turkish Case. 1976-1980 (Santa Montica, CA: RAND, 1991), 10.
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of various political leaders, the junta started to
relinquish power in'April 1983. At this time, civilian
political parties were allowed to partially resume their
activities. Still, a clause in the new 1982 constitution,
written by the junta, allowed this group to bar certain
parties and candidates from returning to politics. 21 In
essence, many of the parties and leaders dominant during the
unrest of the 1970's were not allowed to return to the fray
of Turkish politics.22 New political parties were therefore
created in order to participate in future elections. One of
these parties was the Motherland Party (ANAP), founded in
May 1983, by Turgut Ozal. 23 How much different these new
political parties are from those of the 1970's is a matter
open to debate. ANAP is itself a coalition of several
elements from the predominant parties of the pre-coup era.24
Among the important elements in ANAP were members of the






Selamet Partisi or MSP),25 Established in 1973, the MSP was
one of the first Islamic parties in Turkey. 2 6
Ozal was obviously the champion of free market
philosophy and Western values in Turkish politics. Why then,
would the National Salvation Party align itself with Turgut
Ozal's ANAP party? They aligned themselves with Ozal
because, among the limited political parties and figures
allowed to participate when civilian politics resumed in
the early 1980's, he was the only candidate with credentials
to attract fundamentalist supporters, as well as more
moderate elements of Turkish society. He had actually run
for a parliament seat in 1977 as a National Salvation Party
candidate. 27 Furthermore, Ozal is, "the son of a highly
pious family of Nakishibendi (or Naqshabandi) dervishes from
the eastern Anatolian town of Malatya." 28 This dervish
order played an important role in opposing secularism in
Turkey under Ataturk in the 1920's and 1930's. One
Nakishibendi Sheykh, Sheykh Said, was instrumental in using





28Barchard, 109. President Ozal actually told the visiting
Nakishibendi head of Central Asia that he was also from that order.
Olcott, 125.
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1925. This revolt was eventually declared a jihad by the
Sheykh. 29 Another dervish of this order, Dervish Mehmed,
instigated a revolt in a town near Izmir in 1930, declared
that he was the Mahdi and called for a restoration of the
sharia and caliphate. 3"
As an important part of the ruling ANAP coalition,
National Salvation Party members under Ozal were in an
obvious position to influence government policies. The
results of this influence amounted to the victories of the
first period of Islamic successes alluded to earlier. An
example of these victories included the following:
The 1990 budget increases the spending of the
Office of the President of Religious Affairs, which
looks after the clergy of Turkey's Sunni mosques, by
237 per cent, pushing it ahead of several fully-fledged
ministries. The increase, it is said, is to enable more
personnel to be hired. For the first time, the Office
is demanding the right to be cut free from the state
and made into an autonomous body ....
... Around the same time there was a nation-wide
campaign, supported by several Cabinet Ministers and
not opposed to Mr Akbulut, to convert the Museum of St
Sophia, the sixth-century basilica built by Emperor
Justinian and one of Turkey's premier historic
monuments and tourist attractions into a mosque. This
appeared to be a systematic bid to reverse Ataturk's









In addition, the "conservative" or "Holy Alliance'' 2
element of ANAP was also successful in passing a bill which
allowed female students in the universities to wear the
Islamic headdress.'ý The headdress, "turban" or bas ortusu
(headscarf), as it is known in Turkey, has been regarded as
one of the most visible and controversial symbols of growing
Islamic activism in the country. 34 To some secular Turks,
the turban has been equated to veiling.
Among the reforms spearheaded in the early years of
the Turkish Republic by Ataturk, a concerted effort was made
to change the dress of both males and females. Laws were
therefore passed to. enforce the wear of European style
clothing.3 5 This was just one of many reforms inspired by
Mustafa Kemal, later known as "Ataturk," in an effort to,
"'disestablish' Islam in Turkey," and "to limit its powers
"
3These are two terms used by fellow ANAP members in describing
the Islamic activists in their coalition. "Yilmaz Fires
Fundamentalists from Key Posts," Nokta, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Western Europe, (Hereafter "FBIS"), 28 Jul 91.
33
"Derya Sazak, 'Toward Polarization, ' Paper Views Islamic,
Secular Polarizations," Mil , FBIS, 7 Nov 1990.
34For an excellent discussion on the history and symbolism of
the "headscarf dispute" read, Emelie A. Olson, "Muslim Identity and
Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: "The Headscarf Dispute,"
AnthroDolocical Ouarterlv, Vol. 58, No. 4, (1985), 161-171.
35Ibid., 164.
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on matters of belief and worship." 36 Elimination of the
man's fez is rather well known, but the woman's veil and
carsaf, "a bedsheet-like overgarment covering a woman's head
and body," were also attacked as "backward," and against the
principles of the reform minded Ataturk. 3"
In 1984, this issue gained renewed attention when Dr.
Docent Koru, a university professor, became embroiled in a
battle with her school's staff over her insistence to wear a
headscarf while teaching. By 1989, demonstrations in
favor of the wear of the headscarf led some to speculate
this was the beginning of a mass Islamic movement with the
potential to challenge, "the very foundation of the
Kemalist state. "39
The bill which eventually supported the wear of the
headscarf resulted from a "clandestine" provision put forth
by the budget committee of the Grand National Assembly,
under the control of ANAP at the time. 43
36Bernard Lewis, The Emeraence of Modern Turkey, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1968), In Olson, 164.
3701son, 164.
38Ibid., 161.
"Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, (New York: Council
on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 43.
4OFBIS, 7 Nov 1990.
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Furthermore, this same conservative faction of ANAP
worked unsuccessfully to pass a bill through parliament
which would have brought "practical" religious lessons into
the secular school system."
Another apparent Islamic victory under Ozal was the
signing of a decree regarding "the foundation of special
finance houses." 42 These special finance houses were
actually references to Islamic banks. This decree provided
these banks with special privileges over conventional
Turkish banks in the amount of money they were required to
maintain in the reserve of Turkey's central bank. 43
Symbolic as these achievements and attempts were, the
real success for the Islamic wing of ANAP is not to be found
in these piecemeal accomplishments. Instead, these moves
were merely symptomatic of the true power gained by the
Islamic members of the ANAP coalition through their
appointments to key positions throughout the numerous
ministries of the government. These appointments were
certainly necessary if Ozal was to keep the MSP element in
4 1Ibid.
42Clement Henry Moore, "Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics




the ANAP coalition, and involved positions in all the
important ministries, to include the security apparatus.
The political assignment of Islamic activists in the
Turkish National Police (Genel Emniyet Mudurlugu or GEM) 44
organization is particularly useful in demonstrating the
extent of these appointments and the power the Islamic wing
of ANAP had garnered. 45 A small listing of just some GEM
officials considered to be "fundamentalists" included the
following:
... the director general of security (the head of the
GEM); his deputy, Mr. Muharrem; the head of Interpol;
the head of civilian intelligence, Mr Ali Gokcimen; the
dean of the Police Academy and his aides, and the heads
of the police schools since 6 November 1983 in terms of
security, police work and interior affairs."4
These Islamic activists appointed to the top
bureaucratic positions were naturally influential. High
ranking members in the GEM felt compelled out of fear of
losing their jobs or being transferred to dangerous
locations in Eastern Turkey to attend Friday prayer services
"44Genel Emniyet Mudurlugu is translated to General Directorate
of Security. It may also be referred to as the the Turkish National
Police.
45The Turkish National Police (TNP) is responsible for all
criminal activity, including terrorism, in the urban areas of
Turkey. Besides the Jandarma, which fall under the military for all
practical purposes, the TNP is the only police organization in the
country.
4
,"Prosperity Member Scores ANAP for 'Purges,'" Nokta, FBIS,
28 Jul 91.
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at the mosque because their new bosses were
"fundamentalists." Fundamentalist control of the top and
middle management positions of the GEM were believed so
complete and pervasive, that some police officers believed
these members hindered and even sabotaged police efforts to
control Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. One
security chief in Istanbul is said to have appointed
graduates of "imam and preacher schools" to 21 of 22 faculty
positions in the Istanbul Police Academy. 47
This assessment of fundamentalist infiltration into the
GEM and other organizations was also a view held by the
Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat
Teskilati or MIT)." In fact, because of Islamic
appointments to the General Directorate of Security, MIT
distrust became so great that a rift occurred between the
two organizations. This rift was so serious that, "For a
long time, MIT refused to pass on any serious information to
the security directorate." 49 By comparison, in the U.S.
this would be tantamount to having the CIA refuse to work
with the FBI.
4 7FBIS, 28 Jul 91.
48MIT is similar to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, but
also has a domestic responsibility for gathering intelligence
against organizations working against the state.
49FBIS, 28 Jul 91.
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Eventually, the issue of fundamentalist infiltration
into all ranks and ministries of the government came to a
head in November 1990, when Lieutenant General Teoman Koman,
Under-Secretary of MIT, briefed the new Prime Minister
Yildirim Akbulut, of the threat. In the words of the General
Koman, "religious fanaticism has even infiltrated the
ranks of police units and is trying to devour the state."1 5 0
Akbulut was obviously not pleased by the Koman's
remarks as it was his own ANAP party which was responsible
for their entry into the government. However, the powerful
Turkish General Staff, which had instigated the coup of 12
September 1980, and which believes it has the nation's
special trust for upholding the values of Ataturk against
all enemies, external or internal, backed the general and
his organization's message. Clearly, the military was
sending a veiled threat to the Prime Minister that the
advancement of Islamic, anti-secular and thus anti-Ataturk
values, had gone too far.
The result of the MIT warning backed by the military was
a massive purge begun in July 1991, by the mainstream
element in ANAP. Through all the ministries of government
those officials thought to be Islamic fundamentalists were
50
"NIO Briefs Government on Religious Fanaticism," iayd._in,
FBIS, 10 Nov 90.
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swept out of office and replaced by secular reformers. One
newspaper published a partial "purge list" of thirty top
officials in ministries ranging from the Ministry of
Justice, State Planning, Merchant Marine and Tanker
Administration, to Public Housing, Labor and Tourism.5 '
One anonymous minister summarized the problem of Islamic
activists in government positions and the purge this way:
I think that when this operation is completed the total
number [of people replaced] will be in the thousands.
Government agencies have been taken over to such an
extent that, just as in the security organizations,
people who begin preparing for their Friday prayers
hours earlier, who keep copies of the Koran and cult
books in their desk drawers and who wear silver rings
are everywhere. People have been appointed to desks and
positions not on the basis of their competence, but on
the strength of their faith.5 2
In the ANAP itself, the result was a party congress
which called for the replacement in September 1991, of Prime
Minister- Akbulut by the more acceptable Mesut Yilmaz, who
conducted the purges with vigor.51 Prior to this purge of
Islamic activists in government positions, Prime Minister
Akbulut is said to have been powerless to act against the
rise of the Islamic front. His hands were tied because he
was attempting to maintain their fading support of the
51
"New Government's 'Purge List' Detailed," Nokta, FBIS, 28 Jul
91.




ruling ANAP coalition."' This crisis of sorts for ANAP
occurred as the Islamic wing of ANAP started to abandon its
coalition partner for support of the more outwardly Islamic
party, the Prosperity Party (Refah Partisi or Welfare or
People's Toil Party).
C. PUTTING THE SIGNS OF TURKEY'S "ISLAMIC THREAT" INTO
PERSPECTIVE
Undoubtedly, there have been expressions of Islamic
activism in Turkey during the 1980's and up to the present
time. The infiltration into the government of Islamic
"conservatives" from the "Holy Alliance" wing of Ozal's
Motherland Party, the approval of legislation regarding
Islamic headdresses, Islamic banking, and the increase of
the Religious Ministry's budget, are all seen as evidence of
this movement. Yet, if the political and social evidence
are examined more thoroughly, the case for listing Turkey as
a country under the threatening shadow of radical Islam
begins to unravel. Several symbolic actions during the
Motherland Party's control of the government between 1983-
1991 are examples of actions associated with Islam, but





A good example of the incorrect association between
actions in Turkey related to Islam which could be
erroneously construed as evidence of Islamic activism
involves the expansion of Islamic banking. It is a logical
jump in making the connection from the Ouran's rejection of
usury and the avoidance of this problem through the methods
of Islamic banks, to the conclusion that the expansion of
these banks therefore reflects society's desires to return
to the purity of the Ouran. However, while Islamic Banks
were established by decree and given certain privileges soon
after Ozal took office in 1983, the impetus for these
actions were hardly Islamic.
Professor Clement Henry Moore has suggested several
reasons for Ozal's actions. None of the explanations which
follow are related to the cause of advancing Islam over
secular values. For instance, one justification for Ozal's
support of these banks is graft. Turgut Ozal's brother,
Korkot, who was instrumental in introducing Islamic bankers
to his politician brother, stood to profit by the
introduction of such banks in Turkey. These banks would help
finance oil imports into Turkey, in which Korkut Ozal had a
stake."b However, as Moore points out, these oil deals came
56Moore, 248.
24
about after the banks were already established. 57 This would
weaken such an argument.
Another and stronger explanation is purely political. As
the leftists in the country had been decimated by the coup
of 12 September 1980, the only threat to Ozal's hold on
power came from the far-right elements in the country, which
include the Islamicists and hard-line nationalists. Ozal
therefore stood to profit politically by co-opting the
support of the Islamicists away from the far-right parties
to his center-right ANAP party.5 8 This could be done with
symbolic gestures, such as the decree regarding Islamic
banking.
Third, as Moore mentions in his conclusions, but which
he did not directly recognize as an explanation for Ozal's
actions, the entrance of Islamic banks into Turkey makes
good business sense. By thrusting the Islamic banks into
Turkey's business sector, it would force a badly needed
element of competition into the Turkish banking system and
other elements of society. Moore feels this competition
could help to advance several pro-Western views in Turkey.





of Ozal's use of Islamic banks for the purpose of injecting
competition into Turkish society:
... he may make Turkish financial markets more
competitive and also break oligopolistic public-private
understandings in other sectors of the economy. Such a
transformation might give Turkey the economic base
needed to break out of its political cycle of
authoritarianism and pluralism toward a more stable
form of democracy."
It would obviously be false then to conclude that the
expansion of Islamic banks in Turkey in the 1980's was for
reasons associated purely with the advancement of Islamic
activism.
A similar fallacious argument for the strength of
fundamentalist Islamic tendencies in Turkey is presented in
the turban issue. This symbol is regarded by Turkish
university academics, where the turban is most visible and
vehemently protested, as a "symbol of certain beliefs and
against secularism." 60 Anakara's Hacettepe University
medical faculty were so opposed to the wearing of the turban
that they went as far as boycotting classes and placing
advertisements in daily newspapers in protest."' Yet, it
has not been established that the turban is solely symbolic
"Ibid., 254-255.
60
"University Concerned Over Headgear Liberalization,"
Anatoia, FBIS, 9 Nov 1990.
61Ibid.
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of fundamentalist tendencies. The turban parallels veiling,
and of course, there are numerous reasons for veiling
besides its symbolic display of belief in Islamic activism.
Reasons for veiling include the following:
Interpretation of a passage in the Quran regarding
the statement that, "women should cover their
ornaments"; as protection from the undesired advances
of men; in order to be modest and protect their
reputation; as a form of youthful rebellion against
parents or society regarded as secular (going against
the norms of society); as an expression they will not
compete in a society which values outward beauty; as a
result of poverty; from coercion by others who require
veiling; in deference to their men; and finally as a
political statement.62
How can the argument be made then that the headscarf in
Turkey is only related to Islamic activism?
Feroz Ahmad has suggested two reasons why women in
Turkey wear the turban, neither of which are an expression
of fundamentalist Islam. The first explanation regards the
use of the turban as a symbol of protest against the "Higher
Education Law" of 1983.63 This law, "ended university
autonomy and treated students like children by legislating a
dress code."m64 This is the same interpretation of this
issue expounded by the rector of Aegean University, where





Dr. Koru taught, when he said, wDocent Koru talks about
freedom of religion and conscience, but... the subject is
related only to the Dress Regulation. 65
The second reason for the wear of the turban is even
more interesting and completely antithetical to the notion
this symbol is fundamentalist in nature. Ahmad had the
following to say:
Far from being Islamists in the traditional mould, many
in the movement who supported the headscarf campaign
were 'Islamic feminists' who wanted to use Islam to
liberate themselves from the oppression of their
patriarchial society. This was an urban phenomenon
amongst women who are sufficiently 'traditional' to
describe themselves as primarily Muslim, but who wanted
to play an active role in society because they either
wanted to work in order to fulfill themselves or had to
work because of economic necessity. It was also a
revolt against the drudgery of housework, especially
onerous in Turkey. 66
In this case, Islam is being used as support for
equality-of the sexes, a very modern and pro-Western value.
This understanding of the symbolism behind the headscarf is
supported by others, such as ANAP deputy Turkan Arikan, who
spoke of, "relationships between this matter and women's





Cultural anthropologist, Emelie Olson's work, which
began many years prior to the sensationalism of the
"headscarf dispute," also suggests that equating the
headscarf to Islamic fundamentalism is a gross
oversimplification.'For instance, her observations between
1964 and 1984 led her to conclude that, "outside of
religious contexts, wearing either the headkerchief or the
'babushka,' was more 'conventional' than 'Muslim. ",bb The
"babushka" is a Western style scarf knotted under the
chin. 69
Furthermore, in reference to the specific question of
the significance of the turban after 1984, when the issue
was rekindled by Professor Koruls actions, Dr. Olson wrote
the following:
These incidents of July, 1984, which I have
referred to as the "headscarf disupte," should be
interpreted as recent skirmishes in a long-term
conflict between two major ideological systems in modern
Turkey, one which has been built into the very fabric
of Turkey's political, social, economic, and cultural
systems since before the founding of the Republic.
Although there are several strands to this conflict,
and the two poles vary according to such factors as the
incident, the locale, the participants, or the
commentators, in broad terms it is between two opposing
sets of orientation. As it relates to the present
dispute, perhaps the two most important variants of the




"nationalism" versus Muslim identity and 2) secularism
(laicism) versus an "Islamic society."
This ideological conflict is more dialectical than
merely oppositional. Over the last 150 years or so,
Turkish realizations of "nationalism versus "Muslim
identity" and of "secularism" versus an "Islamic
society," respectively, have evolved not in isolation
but in interaction with each other.70
Dr. Olson goes on to make another very crucial point
which is not only applicable to the specific issue of the
headscarf, or turban, but to the larger issue of how to
interpret the aims and strength of Islamic resurgence in
Turkey in general. She wrote the following:
... contemporary Turkish interpretations of "secularism"
and "Islamic Society" can lead to complicated and
unpredictable results. First, "secularism" may mean 1)
being a fervent follower of "Ataturk's" ideologies, 2)
practicing Islam as a private citizen in a secular
state, or 3) both. Proponents of an "Islamic society"
vary greatly in their definitions of such a society and
the degree to which they would impose "Islamic"
practices on the populace. Thus, within this context,
it is -very significant that Prof. Koru defends her
wearing of the headscarf while teaching by arguing to
her "constitutional rights" rather than by appealing to
Muslim authority.
This important insight highlights the point made earlier
of the necessity to distinguish between social and political
Islamic resurgence, and between threatening and non-
threating elements of this phenonmenon. Clearly then, while





evidence that the movement is related strictly to Islamic
fundamentalism. As discussed above, the headscarf also
involves matters of women's rights, traditional dress,
reaction to the authority embodied in a dress code, the
societal struggle to define "secularism" versus "Islamic
society," and the individual struggle to define Turkish
"nationalism" and "Muslim identity."
As for the "clandestine" bill which reversed previous
laws on the wear of the turban, it should be accepted as a
positive move by ANAP which defused the incident. As Dr.
Philip Robins concluded, "The fact that the demonstrations
over the turban affairs, which in any case never attracted
mass participation, evaporated after the resolution of the
incident appears to have gone unnoticed.",
72
The issues of Islamic banking and the turban were
allegedly symbolic of rising Islamic sentiments. At best,
these have been shown to be inconclusive evidence of
increasing Islamic activism in Turkey. However, the real
success of the Islamic activists was suggested to have been
with the power and influence they received as part of Turgut
Ozal's Motherland Party coalition. How can their power in
this coalition, which allowed them to staff the numerous




their cause, be explained? The answer is not to be found in
suggesting that Ozal or the main element of the Motherland
Party are Islamic activists. Regardless of Ozal's
Nakishibendi heritage or former association with the
National Salvation Party, his pro-Western policies for the
economic development of Turkey, support of Turkey's
application for entry into the European Economic Community,
and staunch support of the U.S. and West, are what truly
defined his politics.7 3 These are the reasons he was so
endeared to Presidents Reagan and Bush. Instead, the
rationale for Ozal's incorporation of the Islamicists into
his ruling coalition rests with the more practical
explanation of party politics.
In 1980, when the military cracked down on the
extremists and political parties in the country, they were
particularly harsh on the extreme left and right-wings of
the political spectrum. By 1983, when civilian politics were
resumed, only three parties were allowed by the generals to
compete. These were Ozal's "moderately right-of-center"
Motherland Party, and two parties led by generals, one of
"
73One need only review Ozal's actions in supporting the U.S.
led war in the Gulf to observe his pro-Western values. These
Actions included his unpopular decisions to allow U.S. aircraft to
fly missions from Turkish bases and support of Operation Provide
Comfort to assist the Kurds in Iraq.
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which was right-of-center, and the other left-of-center. 7 4
The spectrum of civilian political expression in Turkey was
therefore very much truncated compared with previous
elections. Ozal's party claimed to represent all the parties
which had been prevented from participating in the
elections. This included the National Salvation Party, which
consequently lent its support to the Motherland Party.75
Ozal's party easily won a majority 211 out of 400 seats in
the parliament. 76 It seems apparent now that the cost to
Ozal of accepting the National Salvation Party's support
were the appointments of some personnel friendly to their
Islamic platform. As restrictions were relaxed on political
parties, the National Salvation Party, reemerged as the
Prosperity Party, still under Necmettin Erbakan. As they
were allowed once again to participate in parliamentary
elections, Ozal and later Yildirim Akbulut were forced to
grant further concessions to the "conservative" element of
ANAP to keep them from defecting to Erbakan. Therefore, it
must be concluded that Ozal's incorporation of the "Holy
74 Jacob M. Landau, "Democratic Framework and Military Control,"
in Ideolocav and Power in the Middle East; Studies in honor of
Georae Lenczowski, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 318.
75Ahmad, 18.
76Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Economic and Statistics
Department of the OECD, June 1992, 928.
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Alliance" element into the Motherland Party and the cost of
passing symbolic legislation and appointing Islamic friendly
personnel to the ministries is not based on the capture of
the parliament or Prime Minister's post by Islamic
activists. Rather, this was simply the cost of doing
business in a multiparty system in which oppossing parties
were competing for support.
34
II. POCUSING ON THE "ISLAMIC THREAT" THROUGH THE ELECTORAL
PROCESS
Dr. Philip Robins, Head of the Middle East Programme
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, has made an
interesting observation worth quoting at length. He said the
following:
Since the Iranian revolution, Western strategists
have been preoccupied by the "Islamic Threat",
especially in traditionally friendly Muslim states.
Contemporary analysts are forever being urged to
consider whether such states are likely to "go Muslim".
Since the late 1980's, this is a question which had
been asked with greater urgency in relation to Turkey.
It has become fashionable once more to speak of Turkey
as being increasingly fundamentalist and hence closer
to becoming unstable."7
The accuracy of this statement is evident when
considering stories in the Western press, some of which have
been previously mentioned, which proclaim the dangers of an
inherently anti-Western, political, and resurgent Islam.
As Robins goes on to suggest, Islamicist movements may
challenge an existing government in three distinct ways.
First, he describes, "the direct challenge to the prevailing
regime, unmediated by constitutional propriety and possibly
"
7Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, New York: Council
on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 43.
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incorporating the use of political violence." 78 Second, he
speaks of the Islamic threat to a government through
participation and victory in that state's electoral
process. 7 9 Hidden in this threat is the nefarious
implication that any Islamic party gaining the reigns of
government through the democratic process, would renounce
such means once in power and attempt to establish the
permanency of their rule. And third, Robins describes the
"indirect influence" Islamicists can exert upon policy."
With regard to applying these three manifestations of
the alleged Islamicist threat to Turkey, I must dismiss the
first out of hand for insufficient evidence. Already
mentioned in this regard is the issue of the turban, which
was at one time considered by some to be symbolic of the
beginning of a mass Islamic movement. This movement neither
lasted very long once its legality was not in question, nor
as the work of Dr. Olson and others have shown, is the
turban worn strictly for reasons associated with Islamic
activism.
The inability of fundamentalists, as well as





at Taksim Square in Istanbul in February of 1993, for the
purpose of showing solidarity for the Muslims of
Bosnia-Hercegovina, further detracts from any argument based
on the "direct threat." 8' Editorialist Ilnur Cevik of the
Turkish Daily News analyzed this rally well when he wrote
the following:
As politicians like Suleyman Demirel and Bulent
Ecevit have managed to pack more than 100,000 people
into Taksim Square in past political rallies, what
happened at Taksim on Saturday was really a "nonevent"
as it hardly demonstrated massive Turkish public
support for a cause...
... Unlike the outcome of Saturday's rally, the
masses in Turkey are extremely sensitive to what is
going on in Bosnia against the Muslims and is angry
with the Serbs. Yet the public in Turkey refuses to be
a part of any extremist act. 82
It would appear then that even with a genuinely popular
cause with which to unite the country, the fundamentalists
are inef-fective at mobilizing the Turkish population behind
their platform. They therefore can not realistically be
considered a "direct threat" to the Turkish state.
The threat of "indirect influence" by the Islamicists
must also be negated. It should instead be regarded as
a healthy sign, not a threat, that Turkey's much maligned
democracy allows the Islamicists to have a legitimate outlet
8 1
"Editorial Says Ozal 'Humiliated' at Istanbul Rally," Turkish
D, FBIS, 15 Feb 93.
82Ibid.
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for influencing government. Furthermore, as mentioned
earlier,and to be discussed i, greater detail later, Turkish
democracy has already survived rather large degrees of
indirect Islamic Influence during the 1970's and 1980's.
This brings us to Robins' second description of the
manifestation by which the Islamicists may threaten Turkey-
through the electoral process. The alleged growth of Islamic
electoral strength in Turkey is, incidently, probably the
most popular evidence in the Western press of Islamic
resurgence in Turkey.
Since the 20 Oct 1991 Grand National Assembly elections,
the fundamentalist Prosperity Party (Refah Partisi, also
translated from Turkish into the People's Toiling Party or
Welfare Party), has become very fashionable evidence for
some Western pundits and elements of the media which insist
on listing Turkey in the category of countries expected to
"go Muslim." In this section, I will present evidence that
Turkey is not threatened through the electoral process by
the Islamic fundamentalists, as embodied in the Prosperity
Party and its predecessor the National Salvation Party
(Milli Selamet Partisi). This will be done by initially
examining the real "success" of the Prosperity Party in the
20 Oct 1991 elections results.
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Additionally, as foreign policy is often the result of
acting on worst case scenarios, I will also examine the
obstacles in Turkish society which would militatp the
ability of the Prosperity Party to amount to anything more
than a junior coalition partner in any near-term government.
And, in the hypothetical case that the Prusperity Party were
to become a member of a coalition government in the near
future, I will likewise discuss the internal checks which
would prevent these Islamicists from taking Turkey down a
"Muslim path." First, however, it is necessary to briefly
discuss the history of the Prosperity Party and what it
represents.
A. WHAT IS THE PROSPERITY PARTY?
On 20 October 91, general elections where held
throughout Turkey. In a massive show of voter participation
the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, or ANAP) of the late
President Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz was
defeated and relegated to a secondary standing in the polls
for the first time since 1983.83 The winner was Suleyman
83Voter participation amounted to 83.92 percent of the eligible
29,978,837, registered voters. This high turnout may have been
partially the result of the desire to see a new government.
However, the levying of a 50,000 Turkish Lira fine (approximately
$10.00) for not voting cannot be discounted. "Elections Held 20
Oct; Nonvoters to Face Fines." Ankara Turkiye Radyolari Network,
FBIS, 20 Oct 91.
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Demirel's center-right, True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi),
which quickly moved to form a coalition government with
Erdal Inonu's left-of-center Social Democratic Populists
Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti).4 This gave Demirel's
coalition 262 seats in the 450 seat Grand National Assembly.
The real surprise of the elections though was the
success of Necmettin Erbakan's Islamic fundamentalist
Prosperity Party which received almost 17 percent of the
vote and 52 parliament seats. This was a dramatic increase
from May of 1991, only six months before the election, when
this Islamic party had just ten seats in parliament.The
distribution of parliament seats among the various parties
is displayed on Tables 1 and 2, located in Appendix A, page
116.
This was also an increase over their support during the
1973 and 1977 elections, when they received just 11.8 and
8.6 percent of the vote, and 48 and 24 parliament seats,
respectively. The 1973 and 1975 election results are
displayed on Table 3, located in Appendix B, page 117
This dramatic jump was reasoned by some to represent the
resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. Shortly
after the initial election results were released, party
84Sam Cohen, "New Turkish Signals End of Era," Christian
Science Monitor, 21 Nov 91.
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leader Erbakan had the following to say about his party's
showing:
Like a volcano, the Prosperity Party shattered all the
obstacles and hurdles which were placed in front of it.
It is marching to the top.. .As we have always wished,
these elections will be Turkey's salvation. This is
what we believe in. As you can see, the other parties
remained stagnant or even regressed. Only the
Prosperity Party took a great leap forward. It
increased its previous percentage of votes by 300
percent, an unprecedented phenomenon in Turkey or any
other country.8 5
The Prosperity Party is one of the many political
organizations which were formed in 1983, following the
partial return of civilian politics from military controls.
Like ANAP and others, the Prosperity Party is a continuation
of political groups outlawed following the 12 September 1980
coup. It is the Islamic activist National Salvation Party
(Milli Selamet Partisi) which is the basis of this latest
Islamic party. 86 Necmertin Erbakan, the Prosperity Party
leader, also led the old National Salvation Party.) 7 It is
his brand of Islamic activism and the spectacular jump his
party made in the 20 Oct 1991, elections which have resulted
85" Prosperity Party Leader," Ankara Turkiye Radyolari Network,
FBIS, 21 Oct 91.
8
"Paul M. Pitman III, ed., Turkey: A Country Study 4th ed.,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 273.
8 7Ibid. 273.
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in many Westerners fortelling the rise of Islamic sentiments
in Turkey. What exactly is this party espousing?
In broad terms, the Prosperity Party's goals, as
espoused by Erbakan, appear to be the establishment of
government under the sovereignty of God. Government would
therefore play a "coordinating role" between God and
society. 88 This coordinating role would be accomplished
through the use of the Ouran. As far back as 1972, when
Erbakan was leader of the National Salvation Party, the
precursor to the Prosperity Party, he had the following to
say about this matter:
It was also asserted that God ordered us to rule
according to the Holy Book, not our own judgement. If
mankind could be ruled according to votes, men would
not need revelation. In societies where affairs are run
according to the votes of ordinary people, Islam
degenerates. Democracy is a Western plot to rule
ignorant people according to Western and Christian ways.
It is a victory of Christianity over Islam.
89
Besides hinting at how the Prosperity Party would
derive its sovereignty under God, this statement also raises
troubling questions about Erbakan's true commitment to the
democratic process in Turkey. 9" Would Erbakan, in fact,
88
"Religious Party Outlines Economic Model," Curmhurivet, FBIS,
11 Oct 91.
89Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey," middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, (Jan 1991), 15.
90 ibid.
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operate within the constraints of a democratic government if
he were to gain a majority in the assembly? Or, as many
people fear, would his Islamic organization, and others
throughout the Middle East, only work within democratic
boundaries until they had achieved supremacy in the country,
with no intent of ever relinquishing power?
According to Necmettin Erbakan, the Turkish Republic's
economic system under Prosperity Party leadership would also
be drastically altered. Sounding very much like the famous
Egyptian Islamic ideologue Sayyid Qutb, as well as
as echoing what might be considered communist dogma, Erbakan
believes that Western economic models have led to a "system
of slavery" resulting in an unjust society. 9" In Erbakan's
own words, "Capitalism is oppressing and exploiting the
ordinary workers and laborers." 92 Capitalism, however, is
not the only instigator of this unjust society. Western
imperialism as well as Zionism are also singled out as the
"pincers" crushing Turkey and other Muslim nations.• This
combination of Zionism, Western imperialism, and an




"interest-based capitalist system," in Erbakan's view,
results in:`
oppressing millions of people by condemning them to
high prices, hunger, poverty, unemployment and
backwardness and is turning over their rights unjustly
to imperialism, world Zionism and a happy minority that
is collaborating with them."'
It is not exactly clear how the Prosperity Party will
overcome these injustices and create a model society, but
Erbakan has alluded to a few vague notions.
First, he definitely would turn away from Western
economic entanglements, such as the Economic Community, and
turn instead towards Muslim cooperation. The ultimate goal
of this first point would be the establishment of a common
Muslim economic market. 9"
Second, he would abolish the "five viruses of
interest-based capitalism" which hold Turkey back
from prosperity. 97 These five viruses are interest, unjust
taxation, printing money, exchange rates, and credit."
Third, Erbakan would concentrate on building up the







repetition of the old Import Substitution Industrialization
model.9
Fourth, Erbakan speaks of injecting morals into
economics through concepts such as "solidarity groups,"
which would act like guilds, and "moral groups" which would
approve business loans and various economic transactions
based on an applicant's moral character.100
In addition to castigating Turkey's economic patterns,
Erbakan also has espoused a very personal message. Like
other Islamic idealogues, he is quick to make use of the
alienation and cognitive dissonance many Turks probably feel
from the scope and pace of Western influences in their
society.20i As early as 1969, when Erbakan ran for a seat
in the Grand National Assembly as an independent member of
parliament from Konya, he said the following:10'
Thus the European, by making us copy him blindly and
without any understanding, trapped us in this monkey's
cage and, as a result, forced us to abandon our
personality and nobility. That is to say, he was
successful in this because he used agents recruited
from within, who felt (inferior and) disgusted with
themselves, bringing to his knees the Turk who for
-"Religious Leader on Tax, Foreign Investment," Panorama,
FBIS, 17 Nov 91.
"-FBIS, 11 Oct 91.




centuries could not be defeated by the crusades and
external blows. 13
This message of alienation is particularly powerful as
it is highlighted against the backdrop of Turkey's glorious
martial history, of which most Turks are very knowledgeable.
Furthermore, this message hints at the present, unnatural
reversal of dominance between the West and Turkey.
In summing up the essence of Necmettin Erbakan's
Prosperity Party, it must be concluded that his message is
both of material and moral prosperity, as well as a role for
Turkey in leading the Muslim World, reminiscent of Turkey's
past. Feroz Ahmad, summed up Erbakan's message this way:
... he was promising to create a modern, industrial
prosperous Turkey with social justice and democratic
rights for all; a Turkey no longer 'enslaved by the
West' but one which was independent and played the role
of leader in the Muslim world.'" 4
B. SUMMING UP THE REAL SUCCESS OF THE PROSPERITY PARTY
On 1 Nov 1991 the Prosperity Party gained 52 seats in
the parliament for a total of 62 seats. This would outwardly
represent an explosive rise in popularity, as implied by
Erbakan's boasting about a "volcano." However, when the






detail, the possibility of this party gaining majority
control of the government becomes almost implausible.
As discussed earlier, following the 12 Sept 1980, coup,
restrictions were eventually relaxed on political parties.
The National Salvation Party, now reformed and renamed as
the Prosperity Party, but still under Necmettin Erbakan, was
allowed once again to participate in parliamentary
elections. The Prosperity Party then successfully challenged
Ozal's claim to continue to represent the defunct National
Salvation Party, or the Islamic fundamentalists."-" As ANAP
was never sufficiently Islamic for many of the
"conservative" or "Holy Alliance" members in Ozal's
Motherland Party, they simply transferred their support to
the Prosperity Party."" Islamic leaning votes and
politicians whose support and power became visible during
the October 1991 elections, were therefore previously not as
visible under the banner and leadership of Ozal's Western
valued vision. When these politicians and their votes
abandoned Ozal for the true Islamic activist party, the
Prosperity Party, they became immediately visible. This new
visibility of Islamic votes and politicians, which had
10 5Ahmad, 19.
106These are two terms used by fellow ANAP members in
describing the Islamic fudamentalists in their coalition. "Yilmaz
Fires Fundamentalists from Key Posts," Nokta, FBIS, 28 Jul 91.
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existed all along under the Motherland Party, was then
incorrectly construed by some scholars and the media as an
increase in Islamic power at the polls.
In fact, the 1 November 1991 "success" of the Prosperity
Party is really neither novel, nor much of a victory at all
when compared with the electoral standings of the National
Salvation Party (the precursor to the Prosperity Party) in
the 1970's."'v In the analysis to follow concerning
percentages of votes and assembly seats, two aspects of the
Turkish electoral system should be kept in mind. First,
"Since 1950, elections have been based on fully direct
suffrage... " Therefore straight comparisons of percentages
of votes for the various elections can be made without
distorting a party's strength. Second, from 1969-1980, the
"Simple d'Hondt System" a proportional system for
representation, was used to determine the number of seats
alloted to each party in parliament, provided they met a
minimum requirement of ten percent of the national vote.
This system provides a "bonus of seats" to the party which
wins the plurality of the votes. Consequently, a comparison
of percentage of votes won by the various parties to be
discussed is a more accurate representation of party
1 0 7George E. Delury, ed., World Encyclopedia of Political
Systems and Parties, 2nd ed., Vol. 2. (new York: Facts on File
Publications, 1987), 1122-1123.
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strength than is a comparison of the number of parliament
seats each party holds.
In 1974, Necmettin Erbakan, then leader of the
National Salvation Party, was Deputy Prime Minister in a
coalition government with the winner of the 14 Oct 1973
elections, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi) .'0 Erbakan had been invited to form a coalition
with the Republican People's Party after winning 11.8
percent of the vote, and placing fourth in the polls. More
importantly, they had 48 seats in the assembly, the third
largest block. See Table 3, Appendix B on page 117, for the
1973 election results."0 9 In this coalition government, the
National Salvation Party was allotted seven of the 24
cabinet posts for their politicians. The remainder belonged
to the dominant Republican People's Party."'
In 1975, in another coalition government, the National
Salvation Party held eight of the 30 cabinet posts. This was
the second largest block of cabinet posts in this coalition
government. "i'
'°






By comparison, the Prosperity Party in the November 1991
elections was not invited by Sulyeman Demirel's True Path
Party, the winner of the elections, to join in the coalition
government. This completely shut them out of the cabinet and
official government access. Furthermore, while they
received 16.88 percent of the popular votes in this
election, apparently five percent more than in 1973, they
were still only fourth in the polls.
The Prosperity Party was also not alone in capturing
this 16.88 percent of the vote and 52 parliament seats. In
fact, the Prosperity Party ran in the election as a
coalition partner with two other right-wing parties, the
Nationalist Labor Party (Milliyetci Calisma Partisi), and
the Reformist Democratic Party (Islahatci Demokrasi
Partisi) .12 These two parties ran as candidates under the
banner of the Welfare Party when they anticipated they would
not meet the barrier of obtaining the necessary ten percent
of the vote for legislative representation.'13
The Nationalist Work Party is considered to be the
successor of another of the outlawed parties following the
12 Sept 1980 coup, the extreme right-wing Nationalist Action
"1 2Arthur S. Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World: 1992
(Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications, 1992), 783.
"I3 ibid.
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Party (Milliyetci Harekat Partisi)."1 If this extreme
right-wing, but not Islamic fundamentalist, Nationalist
Action Party's election results for the lower house of the
assembly are reviewed from the 1960's until 1977,"5 it
shows this party had various levels of support as high as 14
percent in 1961, to as low as 2.2 percent of the vote in
1965. See Table 4, Appendix C on page 118. Averaging
their support for the lower house elections in 1969, 1973
and 1977, their level of support was 4.26 percent for that
period. 116
Thus, it would be a conservative estimate to assume that
the Nationalist Labor Party element of the Prosperity Party
coalition received roughly between 2.2 percent (its lowest
support in 1965), to 4.26 percent of the vote (its average
between 1969 and 1977) in the 1991 elections. If this
support for the Nationalist Labor Party is subtracted from
the 16.88 percent of the vote which went to the coalition
with the Prosperity Party in 1991, then the Prosperity Party
only realized a scant increase of 0.82 to 2.88 percent over
114Ibid.
"
1 5Under the old 1961 Turkish Constitution, there was a
bicameral legislature comprised of a lower house and a senate.
Under the 1982 Constitution a unicameral body was established.
Pitman, 393.
"
6George S. Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 137.
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its 1973 election results, when it received its highest
percentage of votes for the lower house of parliament."'"
Sabri Sayari, noted scholar on Turkey, who is presently
at the National Academy of Science, has also expressed
similar doubts as to the increase of fundamentalist strength
at the polls, as represented in votes for the Prosperity
Party. He also suggests that when the votes for the
nationalists are separated from those of the fundamentalists
in the former Prosperity Party coalition, that the
fundamentalists have only realized perhaps a one percent
increase in popularity over the last two decades." 8 This
hardly constitutes evidence for claiming a serious threat
of Islamic fundamentalism through the electoral process.
This conclusion is further supported by events between
this coalition after their entry into parliament. At that
time, 19 of the 52 members of the Grand National Assembly
117These calculations are based on a comparison between the
figures from election results for seats in the present Grand
National Assembly and the lower house of the assembly prior to the
1980 coup. Election results for the Senate, prior to its
elimination under the 1982 Constitution, are discounted since the
former lower house of the assembly comes closest to approximating
the new Grand National Assembly. Nevertheless, if the lowest
percentage of votes for the National Action Party in the senate
were taken, 1.9 percent in 1966, and the average of their
percentage from 1968-1977 were used, 3.63 percent, similar figures
would result.
"'Dr. Sabri Sayari, National Academy of Science, Telephone
conversation with author, 23 Mar 93.
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elected under the Prosperity Party's name reverted back to
the Nationalist Labor Party. Three other members of this
coalition reentered the Reformist Democratic Party. In
reality, only 30 Prosperity Party members were elected
to the Grand National Assembly, not 52."9 A full 42.3
percent of the votes which went to the Prosperity Party
actually represented support for the ultra-nationalist
candidates, not necessarily fundamentalist, members of the
coalition. Subtracting the support for the nationalists
elements of this coalition from the reported 16.88 percent
of the votes which went to the Prosperity Party, it becomes
clear that Erbakan's group actually only received 9.74
percent of the vote for the Grand National Assembly. This
figure is actually less than the percentage they received in
1973. Overall then, the true percentage of votes which went
to the fundamentalist Prosperity Party in October 19_., is
no better than in 1973, when they had their best showing. It
would be fair to say then that these figures more accurately
reflect a hollow victory and stagnation on the part of the
fundamentalists, not some sort of spectacular "volcano" of
growing nation-wide. support for a politically resurgent
Islam in Turkey.
"
1 9Figures related to events after the election come from
Banks, 783.
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The Prosperity Party's November 1991 election results
are still less impressive considering the indirect
F'ssistance Islam has received in recent years from the
powerful Turkish military. The military has long recognized
that the real internal threat to Turkey over the last twenty
years has been the radical left, not the Islamic activists.
It is the left which has the best organized, largest and
most violent terrorist groups. Of the roughly 80 terrorist
groups known to exist in Turkey, only 16 are oriented
towards radical Islam.120 The majority are leftists.
Of these leftist threats, the supreme challenge to
Turkey's stability at this time is the well known Kurdish
threat, embodied in the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). As the
name implies, this group espouses a mixture of
Marxist-Leninist ideology and Kurdish nationalism. 12! Since
1984, when PKK attacks began in earnest, this group has
claimed the lives of approximately 5,000 people. Other
groups, such as the violent Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol)
also follow a Marxist-Leninist ideology and have targeted
key officers of the military and security forces, among
others, for assassination. In just one year, between
""'
2
"Active Terrorist Groups in Country Detailed," Cumhurivet,
FBIS, 20 Oct 91.
12 1Michael M. Gunter, "The Kurdish Problem in Turkey,' Middle
East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 395.
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1990-1991, Dev Sol assassinated 45 people, some of whom were
prominent generals in the 1980 military coup. The radical
Islamic groups have been far more restrained in their
actions, killing far fewer people than the left since the
military returned stability to the state in the early
1980,s.122
To combat the real problem of the radical left, the
military attempted to use Islam as a weapon against leftist
ideology. This military support of Islam was translated
into permission to teach more religion in schools and
tolerance of the expansion and influence of sufi orders in
Quranic schools and students' hostels.123 Groups such as
the Prosperity Party thus indirectly benefited by the
military's attitude towards Islam during the 1980's. It is
surprising then that the Islamic front of Erbakan's
Prosperity Party still trails the leftists in votes and that
they did not realize an increase in votes over their 1973
showing.
Lastly, in regard to the Prosperity Party's alleged
victory in November 1991, the question must be asked what
the rational was for the 16.88 percent of voters who
1221 am not callous to this loss of life, but am simply
comparing the almost minuscule efforts of the Islamic terrorists
when compared to leftist groups in Turkey.
12 3Ahmad, 18.
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supported this coalition. This answer can be partially
derived by examining which segments of the population
support this party. As detailed information is not available
about voter support for the Prosperity Party, information
can be extrapolated from work conducted on electoral results
in relation to the National Salvation Party. This is
reasonable considering the party leadership and the
platforms of the Prosperity and National Salvation Parties
are similar.
A 1973 survey of votes for the Prosperity Party's
predecessor, the National Salvation Party, disclosed
67.2 percent of all their votes were from rural areas,
whereas the remaining 32.8 percent of its votes came from
urban sectors.124 As Binnaz Toprak of Bogazici University
in Istanbul said,
In an overwhelming majority of the 67 administrative
districts in Turkey, the NSP polled most of its votes
from the countryside. Only in five administrative
districts- Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, and
Eskisehir- did the NSP fare better in urban
centers. 125
These figures do not lend themselves to an apparent
pattern of support. However, independent work on the
significance of this data, conducted by Toprak, and on the
124Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey




functions of religion in Turkish society, by Ahmet Yucekok,
reveals some very critical thinking which sheds a great deal
of light as to the groups and reasons which sustain the
Islamicists in Turkey.
First, Toprak believes the Islamicists, as represented
by the National Salvation Party, and later the Prosperity
Party, attract the support of "marginal" elements within
Turkish society.126 These elements, "on the margins of
modern industrial society," are groups not closely
integrated into the mainstream because of either social or
economic reasons.' 27 Thus, the 32.8 percent of the NSP's
votes in 1973, which were obtained in urban areas, come from
economically marginal elements. Toprak wrote the following
about this matter:
Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana score highest in the
development index that the State Planning Organization
(Devlet Planlama Teskilati) has put out. Eskisehir
occupies the eighth place and has had a high rate of
industrialization in recent years. Being the most
developed industrial centers, they contain large
numbers of people who have been adversely affected
by industrialization, such as small traders and
artisans. In Istanbul, for example, the NSP received
the highest percentage of its votes from Beykoz,
Eminozu, Eyup and Fatih in the 1973 election. Three out
of four of these electoral districts- Eminonu, Eyup and
Fatih- differ from others in the city in their cultural
and economic traditionalism. Eminonu is a business





traders and artisans (the famous Grand Bazaar is
located here) than big industries. 128
In short, areas within the urban population centers of
Turkey where the traditional economic patterns of the small
artisan, trader, and shopkeeper have been disrupted by rapid
industrialization are likely to support the Islamicists.
In the rural areas supportive of the Islamicists, Toprak
believes this can be explained by the, "cultural
traditionalism of the Turkish countryside.'.129 The appeal
of the rural segments of society to Erbakan's platform,
particularly its religious tones, makes sense when
considering that, "religion probably functions to reinforce
traditional social or economic relationships," in these less
developed areas."" The following is what Toprak had to
say about the influence of traditionalism in the
countryside:
If we can assume that the NSP's appeal to voters in
general is mainly religious, then we can also assume
that the party will have a stronger base in rural areas
than in urban since rural Turkey is markedly more
traditional than the urban. As I have pointed out in
earlier chapters, Turkish peasants have been much
slower than urban residents in accepting the idea of a
secular state, especially one which controls religious
activity. Peasant communities are tradition-bound, and




"13 Ibid. , 117.
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Islam. Hence, they would be more amenable to vote for a
party, such as the NSP, which has established a
religious image for itself and which promises, at least
implicitly, to guide Turkish society along Islamic
principles.131
This would seem to imply that rural votes for the NSP
are genuinely religious in nature. However, Toprak goes on
to say later that this is not clearly established. He
writes:
Eastern Anatolia [a rural area of Turkey] is a region
where landlords (aga) and religious sheikhs are very
powerful in local communities and where their political
preferences are often reflected among the voters during
elections. In the case of the NSP, it is reasonable to
assume that much of its support in Eastern Anatolia can
be connected to "dependency voting," namely, voting on
the basis of not individual choice but rather, on the
basis of pressure from a local patron, a religious
leader, or the like.1 3 2
In rural areas then, the stronghold of the Islamicists'
votes in Turkey during the 1970's, Islam is an appealing
platform. But in this sense, Islam is a tool to reinforce
traditional patterns. Are the voters in rural areas, or for
that matter the peasants who move into the shantytowns of
the large cities and still maintain many traditional values,
then actually voting to establish some theocratic regime for
the sake of Islam, or are they simply expressing a more





Furthermore, one can only wonder what the true strength of
the NSP's support in rural areas would have been in the
absence of "dependency voting."
Second, Ahmet Yucekok conducted a study of religious
organizations in Turkey (Yucekok, 1971), which has led to
findings that Islam in Turkey has a dual purpose.'"3 "In
the less developed areas, religious ties reinforce dominant
power relationships. In the more developed areas, it becomes
a means of protest for individuals who have lost their
economic base as a result of rapid change.", 34
Hence, when combining the work of Toprak and Yucekok,
the notion that supporters, in this case voters, for Islamic
parties in Turkey are themselves Islamic fundamentalists
becomes rather tenuous. This led Toprak to conclude the
following:
If we combine the two observations (his view and
Yucekok's), the picture that emerges suggests that the
NSP appealed either to rural people who have remained
in their traditional communities or to individuals who
have a marginal status in terms of their cultural
orientation and economic status. In rural
underdeveloped areas, the NSP vote probably indicated
support for tradition... Although the religious issue
cannot be considered the most important determinant of
electoral success, it nevertheless played an important
"...Binnaz Toprak, "Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State:
The National Salvation Party in Turkey," in From Nationalism to
Revolutionary Islam, ed. Said Amir Arjomand (Albany, New York:




role in mobilization of the countryside...On the Other
hand, the fact that the NSP's support also came from
rapidly changing communities may indicate a protest
vote by individuals who have been unable to make the
transition to new kinds of economic activity. For
example, it is probably not by chance that the
electoral districts of Istanbul where the NSP received
the highest percentage of its votes are centres of
small merchants, artisans, and shopkeepers."'
While these conclusions are derived primarily from work
in the 1970's, there does not appear to be any reason to
negate these findings. It is still true that the "new town-
dwellers," a euphemism for those living in the squatter
villages (gecekondus) which surround the major cities of
Western Turkey, are suggested to be the segment of Turkish
society most attracted to Erbakan's Prosperity party.136
The immediate assumption in Turkey and other areas of
the Muslim World where Islamic parties are challenging the
government, is that voters for these parties are themselves
Islamic activists. It should now be clear from the
proceeding discussion that those supporting the Islamicists
in Turkey, as well as in other countries, do so for a
variety of reasons not always connected with Islamic
fanaticism. To address this problem at a more general level,
it is worth turning to the insight of Professor Metin Heper
135 EEmphasis added. Ibid., 132-133.
136 "Islam Returns to Politics," The Economist, February 27th-
March 5th 1993, 58.
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of Bogazici University in Istanbul on these matters. He
stated the following:
Nor is the Islam of the ruled a homogenous entity. In
one relatively secularized country, Turkey, I found
that for some (i.e., transitionals), Islam emerged in
the garb of a Durkheimian version of religiosity,
whereas for others (the educated elite), it had a
metaphysical function. Thus, it offered a psychological
solution for one group, a cultural one for the other.
Even more telling is the classification made by Bill
and Leiden of adherents of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, a surprising number of whom are young and
middle-class. There are those who have been attracted
by expediency, those who have assuaged nostalgic guilt
by supporting a religious posture that they have found
increasingly uncomfortable, those who are genuinely
bewildered (i.e., who wonder whether the secular age
they have entered is truly right and who have often
become alienated from a system that they see as
corrupt, unjust and venal) and, finally, those who are
outright fanatics .137
It is almost certain that in Turkey, as with the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many of those voting or supporting
Erbakan's Prosperity Party were attracted to his message for
various reasons. Some of these reasons might include
traditionalism, justice, morality, improved economic
prosperity, out of frustration with corruption, or simply to
spite the ruling parties. These concepts are not a monopoly
held solely by the Islamicists. It is symbolic in this sense
that the Prosperity Party's flag is a golden staff of wheat,
137Metin Heper, "Islam, Politics and Change in the Middle
East," in Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, ed. Metin
Heper and Raphael Israeli (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), 5.
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an obvious symbol of "prosperity," not necessarily Islam, on
the red background of Turkey's present flag.
C. LIMITATIONS ON THE GROWTH OP PROSPERITY PARTY STRENGTH
Clearly, from the preceding analysis it is obvious that
the present electoral threat of Islamic fundamentalism to
Turkey is more cosmetic than real. The Prosperity Party is
no closer to gaining control of the state apparatus than it
was in the 1970's, when complaints were few about it being
"fundamentalist." Yet, in spite of the above analysis
demonstrating the present lukewarm response by the majority
of Turkish voters to Erbakan's platform, questions will
persist about the future prospects and ability of this party
to challenge the secularism of the state. Namely, is it
possible that the Prosperity Party could eventually come to
power? And, if so, what could be expected by such a
government?
As already established, the likelihood of Erbakan's
Prosperity Party becoming a major force among Turkish
political groups in the near future is very unlikely as
reflected in its recent and historical polling. More
importantly though, the very basic nature of Erbakan's
message will clash with elements of Turkish society. This
will limit this party from ever gathering sufficient
electoral strength to become anything more than a junior
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partner in a coalition government, rather than a mass-based
entity with widespread popular appeal able to capture the
reins of the state for itself.
One of these elements of Turkish society which will
militate the power of Erbakan's Islamicists in the electoral
process are the Alevis of Turkey. According to the Turkish
use of this word, Alevi is synonymous to Shia Islam.' '
However, the Alevis of Turkey are themselves split along
ethnic and sectarian lines. For instance, the Al-vis include
the main sect of Shia Islam, the "Twelver Shia," as well as
the "Alevi proper," who are considered by the Twelver Shia
as heretics. 139 Although not much is known of their
practices because of this sect's secretive nature, what is
known of the Alevis differs greatly from the Twelver Shia
and Sunni in religious practices and beliefs. Their very
name, Alevi, or "Alawites" as they are known in Syria,
exemplifies these differences. As Paul Pitman succinctly
wrote:
Whereas the Sunni profession of faith attests to the
oneness of God and asserts that "Muhammad is his
Prophet," Twelver Shia adds the phrase "and Ali is the
Friend (or Saint) of God." The Alevis go even further
by believing in some form of incarnation of God in Ali
138 Pitman, 125.
139 Ibid., 126. From this point on I will use the term "Alevi"
to refer to those who believe in the divinity of Ali, not the
Twelver Shia.
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and recite a formula of faith that indicates that "Ali
is my God" (whence their designation Ali-Ilahis)." 0
It is further suggested that the Alevi have absorbed
some practices and beliefs from other religions including
Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Judaism and gnosticism.141
Evidence to this point includes their observance of both
Christmas and Easter, which would be anathema to either the
dominant Sunni of Turkey, or the Twelver Shia.142
The Alevis are further divided among ethnic Arab,
Kurdish and Turkish believers. This, as Pitman has rightly
pointed out, creates segments of Turkey's society which are
separated from the mainstream Turkish-Sunni element by
ethnic or religious lines, or in some cases both."1
3
As a result of these religious and ethnic differences,
the Alevi have for centuries been the subject of much
distrust- and violence by the Turkish-Sunni majority.
Furthermore, the historical legacy of the Ottomans and the
early Republic, which used these ethnic and sectarian
differences as a means of maintaining power and forging a
"140Ibid.
"141Ibid.
"142Professor Kamil T. Said, Naval Postgraduate School, NS 4300,
Islamic Civilization, Syllabus, July 1984, 46.
"143Pitman, 126.
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national identity, continues to persist. Taner Timur,
formerly of Ankara University wrote:
In the nineteenth century, Ottoman statesman took
advantage of the tensions and conflicts among the
nationalities in order to stay in power; since
republican Turkey is based upon the foundation of a
homogenous nation-with the exception of the Kurdish
people-those conflicts were replaced by struggles
between leftist and rightist extremism, occasionally
cloaked under religious guise such as strife
between Alevis (shi'ites) and Sunnis.'"
This hatred and violence leveled at this secretive sect
of Islam is not a phenomenon of the distant past.
During the 1970's, much of the violence indigenous to Turkey
between extreme left and right-wing groups was again
translated into Sunni attacks on the Alevi, this time at the
instigation of ultra-nationalists, for reasons of political
expediency. The low point of this Alevi-Sunni violence
was the Sunni attack on a group of Shia Muslims in
Kahramanmaras in 1978, in which over one hundred people,
mostly Shias, were killed during a funeral procession.14
5
Part of the reason for this violence against the Alevi
as recently as the 1970's, was their mislabeling as
144Taner Timur, "The Ottoman Heritage," in Turkey in
Transition, ed. Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1987), 20.
14'Howard A. Reed, "Ataturk's Secularizing Legacy and the
Continuing Vitality of Islam in Republican Turkey," in Islam in the
Contemporary World, ed. Cyriac K. Pullapilly (Notre Dame, Indiana:
Cross Roads Books, 1980), 336-337.
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leftists, by extreme right-wing nationalists. The Alevis
were actually not leftists, but have traditionally supported
political parties which, through adherence to secularist
values, would best serve to protect their rights as a much
maligned minority group. A key example of this support of
the secular left is demonstrated by events in the 1973
elections, when tremendous Alevi support was registered for
the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi),
Ataturk's own party. In this election, the slogan of this
party was, "left of center."14 6 As Professor Caglar Keyder
wrote, the Alevis of Turkey overwhelmingly supported the
Republican People's Party because, "They had confidence in
the traditional commitment of the RPP to secularism and its
willingness to uphold the rights of a religious
minority."14 7 The Alevis were at that time estimated at
between five and 12 million people, out of Turkey's overall
population of 41 million people, as listed in 1977.'48
This adherence of the Alevi community to political
groups espousing secularist values is still intact. As
Turkish reporter Miyase Ilknur recently commented during
14 6Caglar Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy,"




the December 1991, negotiations to place Alevis in the
important Department of Religious Affairs, "to some they are
a block of votes that must be won, to others, insurance for
the secular state as opposed to sharia, and to others,
representatives of progressive, modern thought.""49
Notably, these discussions, which involved the then newly
elected Prime Minister Demirel, as well as other meetings
between key politicians and the Alevi, were held in a semi-
secretive manner. While the importance of the Alevi vote
can not be ignored, it is still believed to be politically
risky to openly court their support. As Ilknur continued to
say, "any politician who announces in public that he will
grant the rights the Alawis want runs the risk of drawing
upon himself the displeasure of the religious sector with
its prior conditioning. "15 With the continued inequality
of the Alevis within Turkish society, it can be deduced from
this statement that they are neither likely to change their
traditional secularist voting patterns in the near future,
nor will Erbakan risk alienating his base of power by
courting Alevi favor to increase his votes.





Today, the Alevis are thought to comprise as much as 20
percent of Turkey's total population of 58 million.1 51 This
is not an unsubstantial number. As Erbakan's platform is
based on Sunni Islam, and at times sounds very uncharitable
to anyone not Muslim, presumably Sunni Muslim, there seems
little logic to support the belief that this substantial
minority will abandon its traditional voting pattern of
supporting the more open minded and secularist political
parties of the left. A full 20 percent of Turkey's
population is therefore completely lost as votes for Erbakan
in future elections before the campaigning even begins.
Another considerable barrier for Erbakan's party to
overcome before it could achieve real electoral success is
the strength of the block of left-of-center voters. In the
October 1991 elections, the two primary left-of-center
parties, the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti,
DSP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (Soysal
Demokrat Halkci Parti, SHP), gathered a combined 31.50
percent of the vote (Refer to Table 1). This vote for
these two left-of-center parties is roughly 15 percent more
than the Islamic activists are officially listed as
receiving in 1991 (16.88 percent). The gap between the votes
'
5 1Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald H. Blake, The Middle East and
North Africa: A Political GeograDhy (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1985), 178.
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for the left and the Islamicists grows even wider in favor
of the left, when applying earlier analysis. This
disclosed the Prosperity Party received closer to ten
percent, not 16.88 percent, of the vote. In reality then,
the two major political organizations which openly refer to
themselves as parties of the left, received approximately
three times as many votes than the fundamentalists. Yet, in
the new political landscape which espouses the green
"threat" of Islam over the fading red menace of communism,
no one is rushing to warn of the dangers of the left in
Turkey. It would be interesting to review the literature of
the 1970's, when the Cold War and the fear of the left
dominated political thinking in the West, and
"fundamentalism" was not yet the household word and concern
of today, to see if there was anxiety in the West over the
rise of the National Salvation Party.
The prognosis for future voters shifting from this
pattern of supporting the left also does not in favor the
Islamicists. In a poll conducted in September 1991, just
weeks prior to the elections, 19 and 20 year-olds living in
the three major cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, who
were voting for the first time, were asked which party they
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preferred.' 5 2 See Table 5, Appendix D, on page 119 for the
results. What these preferrences indicate is that for
male voters, fully 42 percent supported parties of the left.
For female voters, the results were even more impressive
with 47.9 percent supporting the left. When compared to the
percentage of people who actually voted for the two major
parties of the left in the October 1991 elections, which
resulted in a combined 31.50 percent, the apparent trend
among younger voters (as represented by this poll) is
towards the left, not the right. This seemingly youthful
inclination towards the more secularists and liberal
left-of-center parties represents another barrier to the
ability of Erbakan to increase the strength of his party as
measured in Turkey's electoral process.
D. THE-PROSPERITY PARTY IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT
Despite the apparent weaknesses in the ability of the
Prosperity Party to compete for support of what analysis
indicates to be rather large segments of the Turkish
population, and regardless of its stagnant performance in
the 1991 Grand National Assembly elections, the possibility
152 1t is not known how well this poll adhered to accepted
reseach methods and cannot therefore be concluded to be conclusive
proof of voting patters. This is also not to say though that this
poll was not accurate. It was conducted by "Zet-Medya," which may
be a credible polling agency. "Poll on Voting Preferences Among
Youth," Tempo, 8-14 Sept 91.
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exists that Erbakan could always be invited to form a future
coalition government. The fragmented nature of the Turkish
electorate, in which a single party often does not win a
decisive amount of votes to form a government, creates the
possibility that the Islamicists may be touted as a
necessary measure of achieving majority rule in the
parliament by one of the more dominant parties. This is
particularly true when the major mainstream Turkish parties
refuse to cooperate with each other in a coalition. This
scenario, as alluded to earlier in this paper, occurred on
three separate occasions during the 1970's," in which
Erbakan was even appointed Deputy Prime Minister. Therefore,
if the Prosperity Party could come to have direct influence
in the government by riding in on the coat-tails of a larger
party, what is to prevent them from enacting Islamic
fundamentalist reforms? The answer is nothing, if they have
their coalition partner's support.
However, this answer should not produce consternation
that Turkey will be taken down a "Muslim Path" if the
Prosperity Party becomes fortunate enough to be invited to
'
53NSP based coalitions included the Republican People's Party-
NSP 1973-1974 coalition, and, "Suleyman Demirel's first and second
National Front governments of 1975-77 and 1977-78, respectively."
Binnaz Toprak, "Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State: The
National Salvation Party in Turkey," in From Nationalism to
Revolutionary Islam, 129.
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form a future coalition government. Even when Erbakan and
his deputies held important portfolios in the various
governments of the 1970's, their inclination was more
towards industrialization, not Islam. A short review of the
Republican People's Party (RPP)-National Salvation Party
coalition which lasted from January-July 1974 is
particularly insightful in establishing this fact.
On 13 J3nuary 1974, Erbakan accepted the invitation of
Bulent Ecevirý, the leader of the RPP, to form a coalition
government. "' The two leaders then began work on a, "joint
protocol" which "virtually became the government's
programme..,S55 The protocol for this coalition contained 23
principle clauses, which might be reflective of what the
Islamicists would possibly attempt to accomplish today 4.f in
power. The 23 principal elements of this joint programme,
which both parties agreed to and made public, included the
following:
(1) implement a general amnesty which would include those
convicted of crimes of thought and forest offenses, as
well as former Democrats who had been depri-ed of civil
rights, to whom they would be restored;
(2) reduce the voting age to 18 years, except for high
school students;
(3) make public servants liable to prosecution not only
for abuse of office, but also for dereliction of duty;
'"Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-!975
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 336.
><Ibid.
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(4) establish a more equitable system of taxation;
(5) prevent waste in bureaucracy;
(6) legalize the ownership of gecekondus-homes built
without permission by rural migrants-constructed up to the
end of 1973;
(7) accelerate technical education in secondary schools,
and to abolish university entrance examinations;
(8) support the co-operative movement in rural areas and
to found a co-operatives bank which would be supervised by
the Ministry of Rural Affairs and Co-operatives;
(9) employ foreign exchange reserves for the development
of the country in the best possible way; and to encourage
co-operatives and 'people's enterprises' to use bank
credits;
(10) take measures to provide agricultural credits to the
peasant to free him from the need to resort to middlemen
and usurers;
(11) establish a minimum price for agricultural produce,
and to announce it as early as possible in order to
safeguard the producer from having to sell at very low
prices;
(12) ensure the efficiency of co-operatives in the
marketing of agricultural produce, and to prevent
artificial price increases;
(13) find a solution to, and end, the unjust treatment of
the opium poppy growers;
(14) change the name of the 1iii::n-y of Agriculture to the
Ministry of Food-Agriculture x.> Animal Husbandry [to
reflect new and wider functioris;
(15) make the operation of public (state] enterprises more
democratic, permitting employees to participate in their
administration, and to share the profits;
(16) formulate an industrial policy for the expansion of
heavy industry-especially capital goods-and to set up a
national armaments industry;
(17) promote regionally balanced industrialization, in
keeping with a geographical balance and social justice;
(18) limit to a reasonable amount the transfer abroad of
profits by foreign investors;
(19) rely on water and coal to produce electrical energy;
(20) place under state control the exploitation of
underground mineral resources, including borax; to re-
examine the Petroleum Law and amend those clauses which
contravene national interests;
(21) import through public companies or co-operatives
those goocs whose price increases very sharply as a result
of shortages;
(22) introduce unemployment insurance, and give priority
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to old people without means, and cripples;
(23) remain within the joint security system and the
existing alliances, but at the same time to increase
Turkey's ability to defend herself, and to place under
state control joint Turkish-American bases and
establishments. 156
Notice, not one of these guidelines for the
administration of this government included anything which
could be even remotely interpreted as an act of "Islamic
fundamentalism." The emphasis of this program was obviously
industrialization. This, however, does not mean the National
Salvation Party abandoned its party stance for the chance to
be part of the ruling coalition. On the contrary, Erbakan
originally declined an offer by Ecevit to form a government
three months before he finally agreed in January 1974.
Instead, what must be recognized is that, as scholar Binnaz
Toprak and others have noted, "the problem of
industrialization occupied the most important dimension of
party ideology."1 57 From this point, Erbakan's occasional
unintelligible rambling about industrialization and Islam,
and Islam's role in this relationship, can begin to be
understood. As Toprak wrote,
,
5
'While lengthy, the entire 23 points are included so the
reader could determine for himself the conspicuous absence of
"Islamic' goals. Ibid, 336-337.
"'Binnaz Toprak, "Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State,"
125-126.
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Turkey had lost its leading position as a great power
because it had failed to industrialize. The NSP
promised to initiate rapid development through
revitalizing indigenous cultural values which would
supply the necessary spiritual and moral qualities for a
new work ethic."'a
Therefore, Islam's role, as the National Salvation Party
espoused it, appears more as a catalyst for
industrialization than as an end in itself. The final result
of this interaction between industrialization and Islam is a
reinvigorated Turkey, worthy of the state's historical
legacy. This actually makes a great deal of sense. If, as
Erbakan might argue, Turkey (actually the Ottoman Empire)
was once the most powerful empire of its era, and Islam was
present in both its glory years and later downfall, Islam
can not be blamed for its decline. Islam was a positive
force for the Ottomans which fueled a gazi (warrior)
instinct-leading to greatness. Instead, it was the lack of
industrialization which led the Ottomans from the pinnacle
of Suleyman's success to the offensive sobriquet of the
"sick man of Europe." Islam is therefore not to be dispensed
with, but remolded as a Muslim version of the Protestant
work ethic in order to obtain industrialization. This led
Toprak and fellow scholar Ilkay Sunar to conclude that Islam
for the NSP had become "an instrument of
'"Ibid., 126.
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modernization... something more to be 'believed' than to be
'lived.''" 59 Quoting Clifford Geertz, they further
recognized, "the 'tense intermixture', of puritanism and
'determined modernism', and the 'steeping backward in order
better to leap' into cultural change and modernity."'16 0
These conclusions, which place Islam in a supporting
role subservient to industrialization, are evident in the
symbolic, but never threatening actions taken by Erbakan in
the name of Islam while Deputy Prime Minister. Notable among
these harmless gestures was the removal of a sculpture of a
nude female from Istanbul Square, officially entitled
"Beautiful Istanbul," which had been erected to commemorate
the 50th anniversary of the Republic."' The NSP referred
to this art as "the sculpture of shame," and had it removed
by the authority of. the Minister of the Interior who was an
NSP member. Its removal was predicated on the believe of NSP
members that it constituted pornographic material.16 2 Other
token gestures included the taking of legal action against
'
59 Ilkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case
of Turkey," Government and Opposition, Vol. 18, No. 4. (Autumn,
1983), 438-439.
'
60Clif ford Geertz, Islam Observed, (Chicago: The Universicy of
Chicago Press, 1968) in "Islam in Politics," 439.
'
61 Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975, 340.
'
62Toprak, "Politicisation of Islam in a Secular State," 124.
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the state-owned television station for presenting a
documentary on Amazon tribes which included some nudity, and
the rejection of a request for government credit to build a
tourist resort on the grounds that "tourists corrupt the
morality of the Turkish people."' 63
Albeit controversial, and contentious enough to generate
sensationalistic headlines, these events hardly represent a
serious attempt to undermine secularism and supplant it with
Islamic fundamentalism. In fact, Feroz Ahmad interprets
these events as simple acts of political expediency. As he
suggested, the leadership of the National Salvation Party
was concerned that as a junior coalition partner to
the Republican People's Party in 1974, their party was
losing its distinctiveness. Concerns grew that, because the
coalition was working so smoothly, if the NSP did not
attempt to reestablish its own identity in the public's eye,
then the party would be assured of losing some of its
constituents in future elections to the RPP and other
parties of the right. A campaign of sorts was therefore
established by the NSP to display its independence from the
dominant RPP through issues which, "would assure controversy




traditional values of the petty bourgeoisie." 164 Importantly
though, actions were taken which would not endanger the
coalition.'"5 It was actually Bulent Ecevit, head of the RPP,
who would later dissolve the coalition and call for new
elections, believing his party had garnered enough support
to win a majority for itself.' 66
Summing up this section then, it can be said that Islam
for the most important Islamic party in Turkey, is
subservient to industrialization. Furthermore, when changes
were enacted by the Islamicists in the government, these
constituted token expressions, never anything truly serious
which would threaten the state. All of this was apparently
understood by the voters. A joke heard during the 1973
election campaign is particularly revealing about this
point. The joke asked, "Why is the National Salvation Party
like a water-melon? Because it's green (the Prophet's color)
outside and red inside. What Erbakan was preaching was
indeed a kind of Islamic socialism."'16 If actions do count
for more than empty political speeches, the lesson is that
his calls for increased Islamic values in the state should
""





be interpreted as means to an industrialized Turkey, and
occasionally as a political ploy for notoriety.
E. THE FINAL SAY OF THE ARMY
The final power which would militate the ability of the
Islamicists from ever taking Turkey down the "Muslim path"
is the Turkish Armed Forces. It has never been forgotten
among military officers that it was General Mustafa Kemal,
Ataturk, who led the military to successfully fight off the
dismemberment of present day Turkey from the victorious
powers of World War I. Ataturk was also the force which
instituted reforms which modernized Turkey and brought it
into the modern world. To this end, the military has
abrogated for itself the responsibility of defending the
integrity of Ataturk's principles, which have served as the
basis for modern Turkey. This attitude is instilled in every
officer of the armed forces. The following is an excerpt of
just a small amount of the required reading on Ataturkism at
the Turkish military academies:
The overall task of the Turkish Armed Forces is to
protect and guard the Turkish Republic against
internal and external threats, and this task should
be considered along with Dynamic Ideal of the
Turkish State, the Ataturk principles. Ataturk has
described the qualities and principles that must
always be borne in mind for the strong, harmonious and
cooperative functioning of all the institutions within
the state, such as Republicanism, Nationalism,
Populism, Etatism, Secularism,and the Revolutionary
spirit, and demanded that these principles and
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qualities be implemented and protected. All these
principles and qualities are meant to ensure a
strong structure for the Turkish State, which
must first be built on sound foundations. The
foundation will be strong if it relies on Turkish
heroism, Turkish culture, and unites the Turkish
nation. The Turkish Armed Forces constitute the
unshakable foundation of the state.168
Among these principles of Ataturkism, secularism is one
of the most heavily emphasized in the training of
officers."19 As former Turkish military officer, now
political journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand wrote:
A point underlined in this respect is the possibility
that, unless state and religion remain separate, the
country may once more revert to a period of decline and
may have to surrender to foreign powers as a result of
losing touch with developments in the modern world."7 '
On several occasions this training, and the attitude to
the protection of secularism it instills, has resulted in
direct and indirect military influence on civilian
government. Specifically, the armed forces have made a point
of only tolerating so much tinkering with secularism before
they feel compelled to place Turkey back on the path which
Ataturk laid down in the 1920-1930's. On three occasions, in
1960, 1971, and 1980, this military involvement took the
form of coups, which took control of the government
166Mehrnet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel. An Anatomy of the




for various lengths of time to restore the politics to what
they, as the protectors of Ataturkism, felt was the proper
path for the Republic.
The event which triggered the 1980 military coup
represents one of the more important historical examples
that the military will not allow Islamic fundamentalists
to divert Turkey from its Ataturkist legacy, let alone
create a theocratic state.
On 12 Sept 1980, after several years of ineffective
government and increasing violence which left dozens of
citizens dead each day, the military staged a coup. However,
prior to this coup, the military had issued several warnings
to the politicians and had even postponed plans for earlier
takeovers of the government. In one warning to the President
by General Kenan Evren, Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed
Forces, Evren as well as the top ranking officers of all the
services wrote the following:
It is crystal clear for everyone to see that the main
condition for the reestablishment of internal peace and
tranquility is to unite all our citizens in an
indivisible national spirit under principles which are
derived from Ataturkist nationalism. The speediest
rescue of the country from its current predicament is
amongst the duties not only of governments but of all
political parties.' 71
'
7 1Mehmet Ali Birand, The General's Coup in Turkey. An Inside
Story of 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers,
1987), 100-101.
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This statement was merely the cover letter to a
declaration by the military entitled simply, "The Views of
the Turkish Armed Forces." Included in these views was the
following paragraph:
Our nation has no longer any patience left for
those who misuse constitutional freedoms to sing the
Communist Internationale instead of our National
Anthem, to those who agitate for an Islamic State, for
those who yearn for all sorts of fascism, for
anarchists, wreckers and secessionists who assault our
democratic regime."'2
Despite this warning, which was issued on 27 Dec 1979,
the military had still hoped Turkish politics would right
itself without its assistance. It may have been that the
military would never have intervened if events had shown
some improvement. However, on 6 September 1980, Erbakan
organized a mass rally in Konya which, "flouted everything
Kemal Ataturk and the Turkish army had ever stood for. ,1
3
During this rally, calls were shouted for the introduction
of the Sharia. As analyst Kenneth Mackenzie
noted, "Of all the events immediately preceding the coup,




173Kenneth Mackenzie, Turkey Under the Generals, Publication of
the Institute for the Study of Conflict, No. 126 (London: The
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1981), 15.
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General Evren and General Saltik as a catalytic factor in
their decision to intervene.""'4
This attitude towards protecting secularism is one which
does not appear to be waning. The Turkish armed forces have
gone to great lengths to ensure its officer and conscript
ranks remain a force free from politically active Islamic
soldiers, as well as extremists of the left. Recent measures
have included extensive investigations of all ranks and
services and mass dismissals from the services of anyone
thought to harbor extremist feelings."'7 With such
stringent measures, the Turkish military will remain a force
free to counter-balance any extremist attempt to upset the
secular cornerstone laid by Ataturk.
F. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ISLAMIC THREAT THROUGH THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS
The-threat of Islamic fundamentalism to Turkey through
its electoral process appears greatly exaggerated. When
analyzed, the electoral "victory" of the Welfare Party in
the important 20 Oct 1991 elections indicates the
Islamicists did not gain much if any support since their
1973 peak. And, among those voting for the Islamicists, one
1 74 Ibid.
17 5"Rightist Movements in Army, State Detailed," Cumhurivet,
FBIS, 4 Jan 1990, and "Military Discharges Linked to 'Reactionary
Views,'" Milliet, FBIS, 16 Nov 91.
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must still question their intentions. Dependency voting,
support of tradition, and protest voting are, in my
understanding, not clearly equivalent to support for a
theocratic state.
It also appears that fairly important segments of the
population will militate the ability of the Welfare Party to
break its traditional fourth place showing in the polls. As
long as the Alevis and other minority groups support parties
defending secularism, the block of left-of-center voters
remains strong, and the youth favor the left, the
Islamicists of Erbakan's party are unlikely to amount to
anything but a junior coalition partner.
Finally, and maybe most importantly for those who see
the future stability of Turkey threatened by the
Islamicists, a strong argument can be made that the Welfare
Party is more interested in industrialization, rather than
Islamicisation of the state. Nevertheless, the Turkish armed
forces have shown in numerous actions that they will not
tolerate the disestablishment of Ataturkism and one of its
cornerstones - secularism. As this force continues to guard
against this phenomenon among its ranks, it is surely
gearing itself for the any future contingency.
Based on the above analysis, it can only be concluded
that while it may be fashionable to suggest Turkey will, "go
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Muslim," there is insufficient evidence to support the
claim there is presently a serious Islamic threat to Turkey
through its electoral process. And, given that such forces
eventually arise, there are powerful forces in Turkish
society which will militate against the success of any such
movement.
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III. EMERGING ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY
Up to this point, this thesis has explored recent
political and social issues presented by the Western media
and certain scholars as evidence of a strong Islamic
fundamentalist movement in Turkey. The final issue to be
discussed concering Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey,
however, is not historical, but just emerging and begining
to attract the widespread attention of the Turkish press and
elements of Western society."v6 This issue revolves around a
new wave of violence unfolding in Turkey's southeast region.
Information concerning this violence is still evolving in
respect to details and accuracy, and is far from complete.
Yet, it is highly probable that those who are drawn into
what Philip Robins implied was a fashionable analytical game
of guessing which states are likely to "go Muslim," will
soon turn to these events in the southeast as proof of the
Islamic threat to Turkey. This final section will review the
nature of a new rash of violence in the region. This will
establish that what appears to be the emergence of an
176Examples include, "Amnesty: Turkey Lags On Rights" The
Washington Post, 11 Nov 1992, A33, and the editorial "In Turkey,
Journalists Do Their Job in Peril," by Senators Cohen and Graham
and Representatives Green and Lewis, The New York Times, 8 Oct 92,
A34.
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Islamic fundamentalist terrorist threat is in actuality a
conglomeration of Islamic fundamentalist, Kemalist, and
religious reactions to the dominant leftist terrorist group
in the country, the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK). And, while
substantive information in the open press concerning this
movement is weak in some aspects, there are several
indicators to suggest that the Islamic fundamentalist
terrorist organization involved in this new wave of violence
is the least important element.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE "ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST" VIOLENCE IN
THE TROUBLED SOUTHEAST
The southeast region of Turkey, in which the majority of
the people are Kurds, is the traditional area of operation
for the extremely violent PKK. The PKK, espousing a mixture
of Kurdish nationalism and Marxist-Leninist philosophy, has
as its goal the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in
what is presently the southeastern and eastern provinces of
Turkey. From camps and way stations in the bordering states
of Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and from bases in the difficult
mountainous terrain within Turkey, the PKK has launched
attacks into this region since 1984. These attacks,
generally involve hit-and-run operations against small
military and Jandarma (rural para-military security forces)
posts, police stations, villages, small towns, and even
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trains. Often, the numbers of attackers are limited to
approximately 20 people. Occasionally though, the PKK has
launched attacks on more secure targets with as many as 500
militants. In its fight with the state, the PKK has also
resorted to assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, and on
more than one occasion, the complete destruction of Kurdish
villages which oppose their rule. Much of the area is under
martial law. This area is collectively referred to in Turkey
as the "Extraordinary Situation Area." It is not an
exaggeration to say that on any given day there is at least
one article concerning the PKK in the Turkish press.
Recently though, the PKK has had to share their press
exposure with a new and growing wave of violence which also
has its origins in the southeast. This new violence,
nominally at least, involves Islamic fundamentalism.
One aspect of this violence involves what appears to be
a growing radical, grass-roots, Islamic awakening. In 31 Aug
92, the Deputy Director for Religious Affairs, Mehmet Nuri
Yilmaz, advised his department had been forced to withdraw
personnel from six of the ten southeastern provinces under
emergency rule. 17 This directorate of the Turkish Government
is, "an official body within the secular state apparatus in
177"Official Warns of Religious Extremists in Southeast,"
Anatolia, FBIS, 31 Aug 92.
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charge of all 'official' religious affairs."" 8 It is
responsible for 63,176 personnel working in Turkey's 66,674
mosques." 9 According to Yilmaz, "6,686 authorized religious
leaders had faced joint threats from separatist [PKK] and
extremist Moslem groups" in the southeast.18° Furthermore, in
March 1993, it was reported in the Turkish Daily News that,
"the Ministry of Education sent a team of inspectors to the
mainly Kurdish southeast to check reports that Muslim
fundamentalists are spreading propaganda in schools."'$'
This disturbing information comes during a time when
between 400-500 people have been killed in the other aspect
of this movement, which has come to be collectively known as
"Hezbollah."'182 These killings actually began in 1987, but
appear to be gaining momentum more recently.
The name "Hezbollah," or "Party of God," is notorious
among Western experts and lay persons as the Iranian backed
terrorist group responsible for several horrific terrorist
acts. Most notable among these are the suicide bombing of
178"State Seen To Act Against Islamists in Politics," Turkish
Probe, FBIS, 9 Mar 93.
179 Ibid.
'
8 0FBIS, 31 Aug 92.
"""Hizbullah Sentiment Seen Spreading: Unsolved Murders Rise,"
Turkish Daily News, FBIS, 9 Mar 93.
182 Other spellings include "Hizbullah" and "Hezbullah." Ibid.
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the U.S. Marine Barracks in Lebanon in October 1983 and the
kidnappings of notable Western figures in Lebanon, such as
Terry Anderson.
Turkish journalist Ismet G. Imset, who is recognized in
Turkey for his insight on terrorist matters and access to
important terrorist leaders, has described the nature of
these murders. First, the targets for this violence are
essentially all ethnic Kurds. Second, they are all
considered by the radical right to be combatants in the
state's war against the separatist PKK by virtue of either
their political activism, or by actually taking up arms in
the fight. The victims of this violence have not only
included the common man in southeast Turkey, but also
politicians from the pro-Kurdish People's Toil Party (Halkin
Emek Partisi or HEP), Erdal Inonu's Social Democratic
Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkici Parti), under which
several HEP members ran for parliament in 1991, various
local politicians, and journalists.18 3 Third, as Imset wrote,
"a majority of targets have no protection and are killed
while alone either driving their cars or trucks or while
crossing the street walking to the neighborhood grocer or
183Ismet G. Imset, "Terrorist Acts in Southeast Detailed,"
Turkish Daily News, FBIS, 27 May 92.
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sitting in their office."' 8 4 Almost all of the victims where
killed by a shot in the back of the head with a single
bullet, or by being "sprayed with bullets in the street.""" 5
Torture is often an ingredient in this violence. Finally, to
the distress of the government, human rights organizations,
and the international press, these murders have gone
unsolved. This has raised the specter of state involvement
or acquiescence.
The circumstantial evidence supporting suspicions of
complicity in these murders by security forces associated
with the state is worrisome. Some local pro-Kurdish
officials in the region claim that while 4,000 "separatist
suspects" (ostensibly PKK supporters) were arrested in a six
month period between January and June 1992, not one suspect
of this recent right-wing violence has been detained.' 86 In
the town of Silvan, a center for this violence which has
already claimed 20 victims, not a single culprit has been
caught according to one HEP official.1 8 7 Additionally, it was
said by this same HEP official that, "security forces first
searched the people of the town and disarmed everyone. After





this, the Hezbollah started its activities."'" 8 This
suspicion of state involvement, indifference, or an
inability to curb the violence against suspected Pro-PKK
supporters, led the locals Kurds to create the name "Hizbul-
Contra." "Contra" in this instance, implies counter-
guerriilas supported by the state.
One terrorist group referred to by the press as
Hezbollah insists its name is the Islamic Liberation
Movement (Islamic Kurtulus Hareketi or IKH).189 According to
one member interviewed, Hezbollah is a name which this
organization is not yet worthy of using, but which they
aspire to eventually use as, "Iran is an example and guide"
to this group. 19 However, group members emphatically claim
they do not receive instructions from Iran. As one IKH
terrorist said, "We do not need instructions from any
country. The Koran is our program and rule."' 9'
Based on what one Turkish newspaper cites as official
records, this organization was established in 1987 in the
18 8Ibid.
"'919 'Hizbullah Militant' Interviewed on Struggle," C,




town of Batman. 192 Batman lies approximately 60 miles East of
the important town of Diyarbakir, where the Super-Governor
and his headquarters control the state's efforts against
Kurdish separatism in the Extraordinary Situation Area.
Since 1987 though, Hezbollah activities have spread to
numerous cities throughout the southeast primarily, and in
other regions of the country. Areas of Hezbollah activity
are now said to include the following: Van, Mardin, Silvan,
Nusaybin, Midyat, Idil, Ceylanpinar, Kiziltepe, Erzerum,
Sakarya, Kayseri, Konya, Adana, Kahramanmaras, Istanbul and
Ankara."'
The objective of this secretive group is said to be the,
establishment of an "Islamic Kurdish State in Turkey.""'• It
follows from this goal that the IKH will consequently be
pitted against both the PKK and the state.
For the IKH, the PKK is seen as "Islam's enemy," and
guilty of attempting to, "create an atheist community,
supporting the communist system, trying to divide the people
through chauvinist activities, and directing pressure on the
192FBIS, 16 Feb 93.
"193 "PKK-Hizbullah 'Political Feud' Viewed", Hurrivet, FBIS, 10
Feb 93.
194FBIS, 16 Feb 93.
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Muslim People." 19" On the other hand, Abdullah Ocalan, the
leader of the PKK, has said previously that he would not
tolerate the existence of other organizations attempting to
establish a Kurdish State in Turkey for fear of weakening
his movement and its efforts.
As for fighting the state, one Hizbullah militant
remarked:
We have one and only one objective: We will destroy
superstition and fulfill the commands of the Koran. God's
laws are a constitution for millions and millions of
believers in Islam... Our objective is to establish a state
for the Muslims."1 9
6
As the Turkish Republic is officially secular,
confrontation resulting from these conflicting goals must
also ensue.
Simultaneous to this violence, "pro-Hezbollah" cassette
tapes are being distributed throughout Turkey by a business
located in the southeastern town of Malatya. 9" Some of the
messages on these cassettes include the following:
"We are the Hizbullah-the party of God."
"The Jihad, or a Holy (Islamic) war, is an obligation
irrespective of age."
"We will impose our Shari'ah."
'




"Hail to the believers of the Hizbullah. Hail to those
rising up against blasphemy. Hail to those who tear
down icons. Hail to those fighting for the case of
Islam. Hail to the glorious, supreme Hizbullah."' 9 8
On the surface at least, the Hezbollah movement, with
its goal of establishing a Muslim state is a threat to both
the PKK and the state. Growing popular support also seems to
be on the side of this emerging terrorist group. With 400-
500 murders ascribed to this Hezbollah movement, and with
the list of victims growing daily, how should this
information be interpreted in the context of determining the
strength of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey?
B. UNDERSTANDING THE NEW VIOLENCE
It would appear from the proceeding examples that
Islamic fundamentalism is an increasingly dangeroas problem
in a region already plagued with political violence.
However, to place the true extent of this problem in
perspective, it is necessary to understand what the
"Hezbollah" movement actually represents.
"Hezbollah," "Hezbul-contra," or "counterguerrilla" is
being used by the Turkish press and the local residents as
both a reference to a specific group, such as the IKH, and
as a generic term to describe all of this violence.
98 Ibid.
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Significantly, in the generic sense, the Hezbollah
movement is actually a reference to a conglomeration of
several counter-PKK, terrorist groups. While one of these
terrorist groups in this Hezbollah movement, the IKH,
actually espouses radical Islamic messages, another is
merely Islamic oriented and can not be labeled as Islamic
fundamentalist. Still another is staunchly supportive of the
state, and a fourth, the Grey Wolves or "Idealists," are
ultra-nationalists' 99 . As all of these groups suspected of
involvement in the anti-Kurdisi/PKK killings are
collectively described by the press as "Hezbollah," and as
Hezbollah is associated in Western minds as the notorious
Iranian backed organization comprised of true Islamic
fundamentalists, confusion in Western circles is bound to
ensue.
The result of this confusion is that the power and
extent of Islamic fundamentalist sentiments in southeast
Turkey will almost assuredly be exaggerated. Violence which
is truly anti-PKK, and in some instances vehemently
defensive of Ataturk's principles, is wrapped up in a name
laden with Islamic fundamentalist symbolism. This confusion
is exacerbated by similarities among all of these groups
199
"'Radical Right' Preparing For Clashes With PKK," Paris AFP,
FBIS, 9 Jul 92, and "Youth Organization Prepares To Clash With
PKK," SABAH, FBIS, 9 Jul 92.
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placed under the rubric of Hezbollah in their overlapping
areas of operation, methods, motives, and victim selection.
This makes it very difficult to separate the violence and
other actions of the radical Islamic IKH, from non-
tin;1amentalist entities which are fighting for the state.
Nevertheless, if these events are to be accurately
interpreted, instead of attributing these 400-500 murders
solely to "Hezbollah," ostensibly Islamic fundamentalist
actions when placed under this rubric, blame for this
violence must also be placed on terrorist groups vehemently
supportive of the state,
C. THE ANATOLIA PEOPLE'S FRONT
One organization fighting the PKK, which is described as
"counterguerrillas," is the Anatolia People's Front (Anadolu
Halk Cehphesi or AHC) .200 This group is said to consist of
approximately 500 armed members. It has admitted to killings
in Batman, the town in which the fundamentalist IKH was
founded, Silvan, Nusaybin, Diyarbakir and Bingol, but
refuses to comment on the exact number of people it has
killed. 20° As with the Islamic fundamentalist IKH, the AHC
also is waging a war against the PKK. An anonymous AHC
2 0 0
°'Anatolia People's Front' Said to Be Force Fighting PKK,"
Tercuman, FBIS, 8 Mar 93.
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leader had the following to say about this organization's
goals:
We are people that have come forth from the bosom of
the people of Anatolia to take revenge, to ask for the
account of certain things by the PKK. I am the people, the
people is me. I cannot kill myself. The guerrillas are
killing people regardless of whether or not they
brandish a gun. we are only killing those who have
taken up arms against the state and who are working to
destroy the state. Among our targets are those who openly
support the PKK. For us, they are PKK militants. Being
constrained by the fetters of democracy, the state is
unable to do anything against the individuals who attempt
to undermine the state and impair the existing order.
Therefore, we took this duty upon ourselves, and are doing
what is necessary20
2
Apart from its similarities with the Islamic
fundamentalist IKH in operating areas and in opposing the
Marxist-Leninist PKK, the AHC is clearly pro-state. This is
absolutely different from the IKH's platform. As the
interviewer of the AHC leader remarked, "These people deeply
revere t/he state. Their eyes glistened when they spoke about
'Kemalism' [t'Tle ideology of Kemal Ataturk]." 2 °3 Naturally
then, lumping the actions of the AHC under any sort of
"Hezbollah" or similar category associated with Islamic
fundamentalism, is to incorrectly ascribe strength to the
radical Islamicist movement in the southeast, which is
actually supportive of the state.
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As for the AHC's relationship with the IKH, the AHC
leader had the following to say in response:
It is a completely different entity. They are a
religious society that arms itself against the irreligious
PKK and have gotten fed up with the PKK. They are people
who have armed themselves in desparation from the state's
helplessness and have begun a war against the PKK. These
are believing Muslims. They have no cooperation or ties
with us. 20 4
This quote, when coupled with the above views of the
AHC, might be interpreted to mean the wave of anti-PKK
violence could be divided into two approaches. One approach
would be the Islamic fundamentalist view of the IKH, which
opposes the PKK because of its "irreligiousness." The second
approach would be the AHC's view of attacking the PKK
because it threatens the Kemalist vision of Turkey. However,
this assessment would also be incorrect. The AHC is also
comprised of religious elements separate from Hizbullah. The
following is a quote by the AHC leader on this matter:
What the PKK calls the Hizbulcontra [from Hizbullah and
Counterguerrilla] formation is in fact the Islami Yumruk
[The Islamic Fist], which is a component of the Muslim
fighters. The Islamic Yumruk is an organization attached
to AHC. The only difference is that they like the
Hizbullah and appreciate Hizbullah's religious devotion,
but work independently of Hizbullah. They work with us. 205
This statement makes it obvious that the argument can
not be made that this "Hezbollah" violence is a black and
204FBIS, 12 Mar 93.
205 Ibid.
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white issue divisible between two elements, one supportive
of radical Islamic values, the other staunchly Kemalist. As
the existence of the Islamic Fist demonstrates, terrorism
based on Islamic values need not necessarily be opposed to
the secular state.
Since the Islamic Fist is primarily combatting the PKK
due to religious differences, while at the same time is a
component of the staunchly Kemalist AHC, it logically
follows that this sub-group of the AHC is not interested in
destroying the secular state. If it were, it could have
joined forces with the IKH or acted on its own. Hence,
although the Islamic Fist is obviously religious, it is can
not be described as a fundamentalist threat. What begins to
emerge from this picture then is a movement which is
secular, and in some instances religious. However, the
religious sentiment in this issue, as the Islamic Fist
demonstrates, is not equivalent to fundamentalism. This
raises the question of just how important the Islamic
fundamentalist component of the movement is in the totality
of this violence. Is the name Hezbollah, with its symbolism
of Iranian backed terrorism, really a misnomer ascribed to a
smaller Islamic fundamentalist element within a larger
secular and religious (not fundamentalist) reaction to the
PKK?
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It would be difficult to provide a precise answer to
these questions without knowing the true strengths of the
individual terrorist groups involved. However, there are
indications among the gaps in the available information
which suggests the Islamic fundamentalist terrorist element
in the Hezbollah movement is, in fact, the least important
aspect of this anti-PKK reaction.
First, it should not be overlooked that there is no
significant fundamentalist movement in the region which
exists outside of the PKK issue. When examining this matter
and questioning the importance of Islamic fundamentalism, it
must not be forgotten that the central issue is really one
of reaction to PKK violence. This is the common thread which
binds all of this violence together. In other words, if
there were a strong undercurrent of Islamic fundamentalism
in the region, why has there been a conspicuous absence of
any terrorist organization reflective of this sentiment,
which is able to survive solely on the appeal of Islamic
fundamentalism, and without resorting to focusing on the PKK
as the heart of their existence?
Second, as already noted, the rhetoric of the Islamic
fundamentalist IKH is critical of both the PKK and the
state. From interviews with IKH members, it is known this
group has as its broader goal the establishment of a Muslim
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stace.'° Yet, if the IKH philosophy of establishing a
Muslim state is the most important element of the Hezbollah
movement, why, as the PKK is quick to point out, are the
actions of this movement totally concentrated against
separatist activities and not also the state?2"7
Certainly, from the available information there is
indisputably an Islamic fundamentalist component to this
movement. Consequently, the answer to this question can not
be based on dismissing Islamic fundamentalist sentiment as
non-existent. More logically, Islamic fundamentalist
sentiment in this Hezbollah movement is the weaker element,
and as mentioned, is probably unable to sustain itself to
any appreciable degree without its focus remaining fixed
against the PKK.
It is also probably too weak as an organization to
attack both the PKK. and the state, and may consequently be
attempting to secure its position first, before attempting
any actions against the state. If this Islamic
fundamentalist element were sufficiently strong enough to
challenge both the state and the PKK, would it stand to
reason that it would strengthen the hand of the state it
hopes to overthrow by concentrating on that state's most
206FBIS, 16 Feb 93.
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pressing problem to internal security? If the Islamic
fundamentalist terrorists of the Hezbollah movement were
actually the strongest group ivolved in this violence, this
would place their membership at figures greater than the
AHC's 500 armed men. Any such figure above 500 armed men
would surely be able to expend some its resources in attacks
against the state, even if only symbolic ones. Yet, the
victims in this new wave of violence remain ethnic Kurds
associated with the PKK.
The issue of tactics also raise questions about who is
doing most of the killing. The AHC is extremely candid about
their methods:
We abduct a person at a convienent moment, once we are
certain he is cooperating with the PKK. We take him to a
desolate place, we explain to him that he has
betrayed the state, and we read out his crimes. After
reminding him that the penalty for this is death, we
fire a single bullet into his head... We ambush those we
cannot abduct and after having dispatched him with a
single bullet, we scatter to our cell-houses in the
city. 20
8
These methods, with the exception of killing someone in
an ambush with "a single bullet," which sounds like an
exageration, are consistent with the reported manner in
which most of the victims of this violence are said to have
been killed.
2 08FBIS, 12 Mar 93.
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On the other hand, the IKH claims to have been involved
in the infamous murder of Bahriye Ucok in Ankara in 1990.209
Ucok was a prominent female parliamentarian, known for her
pro-secularist and feminist work. Attacking someone like
Ucok would be consistent with the IKH's professed
philosophy. However, the sophisticated bomb which killed
Ucok is said to have been the responsibility of the
transnational terrorist group, the Islamic Jihad. This was
determined by security officials who discovered similarities
between the sophisticated Ucok bombing and previous Islamic
Jihad bomb attacks on several diplomats and an American
service member, all-of which occurred in Ankara. 2 1 °
This discrepancy as to who is actually responsible for
the Ucok bombing raises two possibilities. First, the
Islamic Jihad and the IKH are one in the same organization.
However, if this were the case, it would be logical to
expect that at least some of the victims murdered in
Hezbollah violence in the southeast would be killed through
sophisticated bombings similar to the one which killed Ucok.
This technique might not be efficient or even plausible for
the murder of a villager or lesser target, but certainly,
larger cities like Diyarbakir where there are politicians
2
•
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and journalists, would present ample opportunity to place
this deadly method into practice. This is simply not
happening according to Imset. The second and more plausible
explanation is that the IKH took responsibility for a murder
they did not commit.
On one hand then, there are the actions of the AHC,
whose professed methods are consistent with the reported
methods of death for most of the victims of Hezbollah
actions in the southeast. On the other hand, there is the
IKH, which has claimed responsibility for a murder they
almost certainly did not commit, a sophistication yet to be
shown in the violence in the southeast, and a method not
employed in these murders.
As for the religious grass-roots movement mentioned
earlier, it appears that the issue of the PKK is also
involved in this matter. There are definitely Islamic
fanatics in the region, but according to the Deputy Director
of Religious Affairs, in this matter the PKK is singled out
as the guilty party exploiting religious feelings.211 As the
director said, "PKK militants were exploiting the religious
feelings of the people by pretending that they were prepared
to 'die for their kinsfolk.'" 212 In some cases, "PKK
2 11FBIS, 31 Aug 92.
2 12 Ibid.
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separatists have even spread the idea that the prophet
Abraham was of Kurdish origin." 213 What appears as the
beginnings of a grass-roots Islamic fundamentalist movement
then, is also simply another component of the struggle
between the state and PKK. In this instance, the PKK is
attempting to misdirect the piety of the population by
discrediting the state's appointed religious leaders. How
serious is this problem? The Turkish Interior Minister Ismet
Sezgin did not appear very concerned. His feelings about
this matter are clear from the following quote:
They [Islamic fundamentalists] are terror
organizations, and they have the same objectives: They
want to destroy the state and overthrow the government.
We are taking action against this terror with all our
might. However, this antlsecular movement is not a
movement that must be taken seriously."1214
Furthermore, the Deputy Director's recommendation for
dealing with this problem was to broadcast more religious
programs on the local televisions, "because the holy Koran
is based on love, brotherhood, tolerance and justice." These
words and actions do not seem like those of someone who is
facing a serious Islamic fundamentalist threat.
2 1 3ibid.
214Emphasis added. "Interior Minister Views Kurds, PKK,
Fundamentalism," Vienna DER STANDARD, FBIS, 13-14 Mar 93.
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D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE HEZBOLLAH MOVEMENT
In time, as more information becomes available
concerning the Hezbollah movement, the true nature of this
violence will be exposed. In the meantime, confusion arising,
from the inappropriate use of the name "Hezbollah" with this
violence is sure to arouse further concerns in the West that
Turkey is facing a serious Islamic fundamentalist threat. It
may be that as further details are acquired about the
strength of these terrorist organizations, the radical
Islamic, IKH terrorist group is proven to be the dominant
element of this movement, and a true threat to the state.
Until a conclusive answer is discovered, as pointed out
previously, there are several reasons to judge with caution
the warnings of those who would prematurely say that
Hezbollah violence is an Islamic fundamentalist threat to
the state. The questionable veracity of the IKH is just one
of these reasons.
Finally, the common thread behind this new violence must
be kept clearly in mind. It is the PKK which is the present
threat to the state and the focus of all of this violence.
In spite of the publicity the Hezbollah movement may
eventually receive, it is the Marxist-Leninist PKK which has
killed over 5,000 people, and challenges the state for
control of its southeastern provinces. Compared to this
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violence, the Hezbollah movement, whether it is proven to be
predominantly state-supportive, Islamic fundamentalist, or a
combination of both, is merely a side show at the moment.
Consequently, while it may be fashionable to find evidence
of the green threat to Turkey, the evidence supports the
fact that the leftists are presently the most dangerous
challenge to the state.
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ACCURACY OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM IN TURKEY
AS mentioned earlier, in Turkey, a country of 55.4
million people, 99 percent of whom are Muslim, it would be
ludicrous to suggest there is no support for Islamic
activism. That has never been the message of this paper.
There are true signs of politically active, often radical,
Muslim elements in Turkey. For the West, the most visible of
these fringe elements of Islamic activism are the radical
Islamic terrorist groups. They are likely to continue with
their deadly terrorist attacks which will present a risk to
certain individuals. Prominent journalists, government
officials, others who champion the cause of secularism, and
foreign military and diplomatic personnel appear to be their
present targets. These attacks should not be taken lightly.
Significantly though, these terrorist actions represent a
real threat to only small groups of select people. This is
altogether different from threatening the stability of the
state.
I have also not attempted to paint the picture that
Turkey is completely secular, either in its government, or
society in general. There has been a synthesis of the
moderate right and even the left with Islamic political
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parties. This has occurred because, as historian Martin
Kramer noted, these parties, "began to appreciate the
political benefits that accrued from inclusion of Islamic
planks in their platforms." These benefits derived from
the use of Islam and its symbols would not exist if Islam in
Turkey were dead.
Even the popular Turkish media, targets for some radical
Islamic terrorist groups, have not divorced themselves
entirely from Islam. When the newspaper Sabah decided last
June that it would publish during the Kurban Bayrami (Feast
of Sacrifice) holiday, which is against Turkish law, it
raised a storm of controversy among the associations of
journalists in the country. The leader of the Istanbul
Journalists' Association went so far as to criticize Sabah
for going against, "all moral principles." It may be
that the "principles" implied to refer to breaking the law,
but it is interesting none the less that Turkey's other
major newspapers did not follow Sabah's example and that
such a law would even exist.
The message I am attempting to communicate is that the
threat of radical Islam in Turkey appears drastically out of
proportion to the evidence presented in the media and by
some Western scholars. Neither the success of Islamic
politicians under Ozal, the symbolic actions they were able
ill
to achieve, the Prosperity Party's showing in November 1991,
the emerging Hezbollah movement, nor other factors
considered in this paper, when examined more thoroughly,
suggest a serious threat to Turkey's stability.
The threat from Islamic activism in Turkey today is even
less realistic than implied in the popular Western media
when the role of the Turkish military as protector's of
Ataturk's legacy is brought into focus. The Turkish armed
forces have gone to great lengths to ensure its officer and
conscript ranks remain a force free from politically active
Islamic soldiers, as well as extremists of the left.
Measures have included extensive investigations of all ranks
and services and mass dismissals from the service of anyone
thought to harbor extremist feelings. With such
stringent measures, the Turkish military will remain a force
free to counter-balance any extremist attempt to upset the
secular cornerstone laid by Ataturk. The Turkish military's
interventions into civilian rule in 1960, 1971, and 1980,
stand as testaments that only limited interference with
Ataturk's secular legacy will be tolerated.
The criticism leveled at the Western media and some
Western scholars is not to suggest these peolle are
disingenuous with the information they present. Rather, the
inaccurate assessment of the threat of radical Islam in
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Turkey demonstrates the much larger misunderstanding of the
phenomenon of "fundamentalism," and the Islamic World in
general. As demonstrated in the examination of the growth of
Islamic banks, and the turban in Turkey, the presence
of Islam in a politically charged topic is not conclusive
proof of Islamic fundamentalism. The symbols and religion of
Islam apply to a wide variety of situations, and the
solutions derived from the application of Islam are not
automatically antithetical to Western values. Islamic
symbols, just as those of other religions, are malleable and
subject to various interpretations. Some of these
interpretations will stand against what is believed correct
and modern in the West, others will mirror Western values.
This was demonstrated in the use of Islam and the turban to
support "Islamic feminism."
Still other groups will promote Islam and co-opt its
symbols and power to advance Western visions of modernity.
Ozal attempted this by using the Islamic vote in his
coalition to overpower his main rivals and enact his Western
vision. His acceptance of and assistance to Islamic banking
in Turkey is argued to have been with the intent to create a
more competitive system which would foster increased
democratization. Even the military, the guardian of
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Ataturk's secular reforms, promoted Islam as a tool against
the real threat of the left.
It must also be recognized that the Islamic
fundamentalists are themselves not a monolithic group and
that they vary in beliefs and actions. Furthermore, those
who support these groups do so for a variety of reasons.
Islamic groups do not only preach for a return of the
sharia, or protection of the umnna. Many involved in this
movement, such as Erbakan, appeal to peoples' disgust of
their economic desparation, promising a better tomorrow,
not unlike every other politician. The piety of some of
these Islamic activists, when considered against the
corruption prevalent in many Third World Islamic nations
must also strike a deep chord among the population.
Western scholars and the media must therefore come to
a more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon if
they are to ever understand it. Those who represent Islam as
a force to be used against the West do not represent the
majority of Muslims anymore than intolerant Christian and
Jewish fringe groups in this country represent the U.S.
population. Those who support the fundamentalists do so for
a variety of reasons. Those who use Islam as a tool are not
necessarily Islamic fundamentalists or even devout Muslims.
And most importantly, Islam is not equivalent to Islamic
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fanaticism. Only when these and other lessons about Islamic
culture are inculcated in Western attitudes can we improve
the accuracy of our understanding of this phenomenon we have
come to know as "Islamic fundamentalism."
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENT SEATS AMONG
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TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES AMONG PARTIES, 1 NOV 91216
Party Number of votes Percentage Seats
Motherland Party 5,862,639 24.01 115
Prosperity Party 4,121,292 16.88 62
Socialist Party 108,374 0.44
True Path Party 6,600,644 27.03 178
Democratic Leftists 2,624,310 10.75 7
Party -





"Party Seats in National Assembly Broken Down," Turkish
Radio and Television Network, FBIS, 23 May 91.
21 6
"Final Assembly Election Results Announced," Ankara
Turkiye Radyolari Network, FBIS, 1 Nov 91.
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 3 ELECTION RESULTS, 1973 AND 1977 ELECTIONS2 "'
Percent of Votes Number of Seats
Received
Party 1973 1977 1973 1977
Justice Party 29.8% 36.9% 14-9 189
Republican People's
Party "33.3 41.4 185 213
Republican Reliance
Party 5.3 1.9 13 3
Democratic Party 11.9 1.9 45 1
Nation Party 0.6 - - -
National Action
Party 3.4 6.4 3 16
National Salvation




Party - 0.1 - -
Independents 2.8 2.5 6 4
2 1 7Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, 119.
117
APPENDIX C
TABLE 4 PERCENTAGE OF VOTES IN LOWER HOUSE, 1961-1977220
Party 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977
Nationalist Action Party 14.0 2.2 3.0 3.4 6.4





TABLE 5 PREFERENCE OF MALE VOTERS, 19-20 YEAR-OLDS
2 1 9
ANAP (right-of-center), 27.7 percent
SHP (left-of-center), 27.3 percent
DSP (left-of-center), 14.7 percent
DYP (right-of-center), 13.9 percent
Total: 83.6 percent
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